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ABSTRACT
Scholarship on negotiation theory and practice is rich and well-
developed. Almost no work has been done, however, to translate
to the criminal context the lessons learned about negotiation
from extensive empirical study using the disciplines of econom-
ics, game theory, and psychology. This Article suggests that de-
fense lawyers in criminal negotiations can employ tools
frequently useful to negotiators in other arenas: neutral criteria
as a standard of legitimacy. Judges sometimes exercise a type of
discretion analogous to prosecutorial discretion. When they do
so, they offer an independent, reasoned, and publicly available
assessment of the factors that a prosecutor ought to consider in
deciding whether to grant leniency. In negotiations, defense law-
yers can use these guidelines offered by judges as a soft limita-
tion on the largely unchecked power of prosecutors. Judges have
been reluctant, however, to exercise the power clearly assigned to
them, and defense lawyers have been slow to recognize the value
of the guidance that judges have provided.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutorial discretion is, almost by definition, unmoored from
any legal rule or principle.1 Prosecutors have all but unfettered dis-
cretion to charge all, some, or no perpetrators of crime.2 Given the
1. The extraordinary role of discretion in determining outcomes in legal systems
has long been recognized. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUS-
TICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (Univ. of Ill. Press, 1971). By contrast, judges tend to
limit themselves to matters that Richard Fallon has described as capable of being
regulated by “judicially manageable standards.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275,
1287–93 (2006) (observing that the Supreme Court seeks rules or standards that pro-
duce predictability and consistent results).
2. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 397 (2001) (observing that “prosecutors daily
exercise practically unlimited discretion.”); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (recognizing the discretion of prosecutors to choose which of
many applicable statutes to charge); Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375,
380 (2d Cir. 1973) (“the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecutorial
decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary”). Inmates of Attica
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consequences that flow from prosecutors’ decisions, this unreviewable
power renders the individual assistant district attorney, who is some-
times fresh out of law school, one of the most powerful officials at any
level of government.
It is frequently argued that there ought to be some sort of check
on prosecutors’ ability to decide which charges to bring and which
plea deals to make, but these proposals often fail due to separation of
powers concerns.3 Soft limitations on prosecutorial power, however,
are possible without any modification to the basic division of labor
between prosecutors and judges. Courts are often reluctant to exer-
cise even expressly-given powers that resemble prosecutorial deci-
sion-making, but when they do, courts provide important guidance to
subsequent parties attempting to resolve criminal cases outside of
the formal judicial process.
As courts begin to acknowledge long-standing academic concerns
about unregulated prosecutorial power,4 judicial opinions that offer
guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, without directly
imposing limits on charging or bargaining, may provide a politically
palatable means of soft regulation. Defense attorneys can and should
look to how courts have exercised their prosecutorial-like powers as
persuasive authority on how courts believe prosecutors should con-
sider the equities of a particular case.
It is certainly not a new concept that judges should be a part of
the discussion about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Most
commentators who call for a judicial role in the plea bargaining and
charging process envision judges deferentially overseeing the work of
prosecutors, much as appellate courts review the fact finding of trial
established that not only is there no obligation on prosecutors to bring charges, there
is no requirement that prosecutors or police investigate any crime. 477 F.2d at 381.
Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights has concluded that courts can
require authorities to conduct an adequate investigation before declining to bring a
prosecution. Finucane v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 375 (2003).
3. See note 6 infra.
4. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2011) (requiring constitutionally
adequate performance by defense counsel as the plea bargaining process “is the crimi-
nal justice system.”) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992) and citing Rachel Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)); see, e.g., Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1392 (2011) (Scalia, A., dissenting) (contending that the ratio-
nale of the majority in Missouri v. Frye will lead to regulation of prosecutorial
conduct).
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courts.5 These proposals are frequently criticized as creating separa-
tion of powers concerns.6 We propose that courts should have an advi-
sory role, which courts are already exercising in varying degrees of
frequency. Courts should be neither rubber stamps, passively approv-
ing of prosecutors’ decisions, nor dictatorial judicial activists. Rather,
courts should use opportunities to exercise pseudo-prosecutorial dis-
cretion for the purpose of guiding the charging and plea bargaining
process.
When courts make these charging and bargaining decisions, they
create standards of legitimacy for subsequent negotiations between
prosecutors and defense lawyers. Borrowing from the scholarship on
negotiation, we propose that defense counsel in the criminal justice
system use these standards to check the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.7
5. See, e.g., ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 5–8 (Louisiana
State Univ. Press, 1981); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Po-
licing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 907–08
(2009); Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 5, 1035–40 (2006); Frank F. Skil-
lern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making,
13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 491–92, 494 (1973); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commis-
sions as Provocateurs of Self Regulation of Prosecutorial Self Regulation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1010 (2005) (describing potential role of sentencing commissions in providing
standards for exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
6. But see Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 1012–20 (observing
that separation of powers concerns do not justify the degree of judicial deference given
to prosecutors as there is judicial review of other executive agents); Rachel E. Barkow,
The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1332, 1336 (2008).
7. The implications of the vast scholarship of negotiation have not been consid-
ered for criminal cases. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Infor-
mation Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 182 (2007) (“[T]he
rich literature on biases and heuristics is a tremendous resource for those studying
negotiations between prosecutors and defense lawyers.”). In the civil context, studies
in economics, game theory, and psychology have all proven useful to those studying
negotiations. See J. KEITH MURNIGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES: A NEW APPROACH TO
STRATEGIC THINKING IN NEGOTIATIONS (1993) (applying game theory to negotiation
situations); Deepak Malhotra & Max H. Bazerman, Psychological Influence in Negoti-
ation: An Introduction Long Overdue, 34 J. MGMT. 509 (2008); see also, e.g., Robert J.
Condlin, Legal Bargaining Theory’s New ‘Prospecting’ Agenda: It May Be Social Sci-
ence, But Is It New?, 10 PEPP. DISP. RES. L. J. 215, 220 n.30 (2010) (observing that
“[j]ournals in social psychology, economics, organization theory, and related fields
published articles on bargaining long before law journals, but little of this work made
its way into legal bargaining scholarship.”). This diverse array of scholarship suggests
many ways for defense counsel to increase their bargaining power: using psychologi-
cal factors such as anchoring, improving their relationships with prosecutors, collect-
ing good information from their clients, and so on. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
Getting to “Guilty:” Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115,
122–23, 135–40 (1997). In this Article, we will focus on introducing standards of legiti-
macy into the negotiation process.
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Standards of legitimacy, as we explain below, have many positive
impacts on a negotiation and the parties. These standards can
change a negotiation partner’s perception of his or her alternatives,
leverage the psychological pressure of justification, provide justifica-
tion to supervisors and other third parties, and appeal to rational ba-
ses of analysis. Perhaps most importantly in criminal negotiations,
standards of legitimacy allow prosecutors to better consider their
dual role as both advocates and quasi-judicial actors. While there are
many different standards to be considered, this Article focuses specif-
ically on areas where third parties to the plea bargain negotiation —
namely judges — are empowered to create legitimate standards for
prosecutorial discretion.
In deciding a variety of issues, courts are permitted to exercise
the type of discretion believed to be uniquely entrusted to prosecu-
tors.8 Only the vaguest legal standards govern application of de
minimis statutes, proportionality review in capital cases, the applica-
tion of California’s three-strikes law, or the denial of pretrial diver-
sion. Courts in these types of cases essentially are left to decide
whether the prosecutor’s charging decision was appropriate. Like-
wise, courts must make similar decisions when they sentence defend-
ants who were — or, if charged differently, would have been —
subject to mandatory guidelines or minimums. Reduction of
sentences in such situations reveal judicial disagreement with the
charging decision, while sentences imposed above an uncharged
mandatory minimum suggest judicial approval of a charge requiring
the minimum sentence. Finally, judges fashioning remedies for de-
fendants who receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea
bargaining process must look at the motivations of prosecutors in
making plea offers. As they do, courts identify how a prosecutor could
have arrived at the offered plea, and how the defendant lost that plea
due to ineffectiveness of counsel. Because the remedy may not give
defendants a windfall, courts must determine which portion of the
leniency offered was motivated by the equities of the case, rather
than utilitarian motivations such as cooperation, risk aversion, and
8. In civil contexts, such standards are easier to identify. When cars are sold, for
instance, Kelly’s Bluebook provides an independent source providing its value. See,
e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN 81–92 (1992) (describing use of standards of legitimacy). Examples, as
described below, include dismissing cases under de minimis statutes, finding three-
strikes provisions inapplicable, rejecting prosecutorial denials of pre-trial diversion,
sentencing decisions where mandatory minimums are not sought, departures from
federal sentencing guidelines, and providing remedies for defendants who have re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation phase of a trial.
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preservation of resources, none of which remain to be traded after a
case has been resolved.
Courts have been reluctant to robustly exercise their discretion
to provide guidance on the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion — a somewhat surprising fact, given that mandatory mini-
mum sentences and sentencing guidelines originally vested power in
judges, as opposed to prosecutors.9 As their power shifts to prosecu-
tors, judges could conceivably wish to participate in the exercise of
the discretion previously entrusted to them, yet they have not done so
as robustly as they are clearly entitled to do. Judges are often troub-
led by the virtually absolute power of prosecutors,10 but separation of
powers and expertise concerns have discouraged judges from using
their powers to establish persuasive criteria for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.11
Courts often refuse to reconsider charging decisions made by
prosecutors, not only because of separation of powers concerns, but
also because courts feel they lack the expertise to make decisions that
may not be reduced to legal standards. For similar reasons, courts
are loathe to create standards that they have not been authorized by
the legislature to create.12 Legislatures have, however, empowered
courts to render decisions in criminal cases — allowing them to dis-
miss cases, reject plea offers, and ignore sentencing guidelines — for
reasons that defy explanation by legal rules. In essence, judges occa-
sionally engage in the same sort of multi-factored equitable consider-
ations that define what is believed to be the exclusive domain of
prosecutors. Judges are reluctant to venture into such waters, but
when they do, they provide guidance to prosecutors and defense law-
yers on the appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion.
Given its rarity, instances of judges exercising prosecutorial dis-
cretion are likely useful to defense counsel only for the purpose of
9. A number of judges resigned rather than be forced to apply the previously
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Susan R. Klein, DOJ’s Attack on Fed-
eral Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Failure of Criminal
Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 523 (2009). Others have been sharply critical of the
Guidelines. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew Morriss, Charting the In-
fluences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1377, 1413 nn.1362–64 (1998). Therefore, it would seem that judges would
take opportunities given to them to shape the way prosecutors exercise their discre-
tion. Yet, as will be illustrated below, they have been quite reluctant to do so.
10. See KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 130–42 (1998); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
11. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 53–58.
12. See Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973).
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demonstrating in general terms the types of factors that prosecutors
ought to consider in exercising leniency. Even this degree of gui-
dance, however, would be helpful to, and has long been overlooked by,
counsel entering negotiations in which they have a distinct disadvan-
tage. For their part, judges concerned about the unchecked power of
prosecutors should recognize that their guidance helps place soft lim-
its on prosecutors.
This Article first addresses how judicially fashioned standards of
legitimacy can be useful to defense counsel in the course of plea bar-
gaining negotiations and then considers the avenues available to
courts for providing such criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.
II. THE VALUE OF JUDICIALLY CREATED CRITERIA FOR
DEFENSE COUNSEL
A. Cabining Unlimited Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors possess extraordinary power to charge defendants.13
Prosecutors decide what charges to file, which essentially defines
each case.14 In addition, prosecutors are free to add additional
charges and enhancements without limit after the case has been
filed.15 The prosecutor chooses whether to make a plea offer. As one
judge has described it, “the prosecutor has the information; he has all
the chips . . . .”16 This discretion can lead to abuses of power,17 false
confessions or false accusations,18 and even a lack of trust in the en-
tire criminal justice system.19
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
257–61 (2011).
14. Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The
Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 598 (2014).
15. Id.; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 87–89 (2012).
16. Gilien Silsby, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, USC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014),
http://news.usc.edu/61662/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (quoting the Hon. Jed
Rakoff, US District Judge).
17. See The Kings of the Courtroom: How Prosecutors Came to Dominate the
Criminal-Justice System, ECONOMIST (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
united-states/21621799-how-prosecutors-came-dominate-criminal-justice-system-
kings-courtroom.
18. A Plea for Change: American Prosecutors Have too much Power. Hand Some
of it to Judges, ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21
621784-american-prosecutors-have-too-much-power-hand-some-it-judges-plea-
change.
19. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GEO. L. REV.
407, 420–25 (2008).
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Negotiation of a plea bargain is both incredibly important and
difficult for defense counsel and their clients. Both judges, who often
lament the power of prosecutors, and defense lawyers, who have obvi-
ous institutional reasons to limit the power of prosecutors, profit from
an understanding of the literature on negotiation. The criteria that
judges fashion when they exercise pseudo-prosecutorial discretion
can prove extraordinarily helpful to defense lawyers in the course of
negotiations.
One can conceive of the defense counsel as a negotiator and the
plea bargain as a negotiation.20 Indeed, courts consider a plea to be a
bargain struck by two independent parties, treat the plea agreement
as a contract, and see the bargaining process as a type of contractual
transaction.21 Legal scholars also view plea agreements as a form of
negotiated dispute resolution.22 As two scholars have described the
issue, “the typical plea bargain is strikingly similar to the simple
dickered bargain — my used car for $500 — that is the staple exam-
ple of enforceable exchange . . . .”23
There are many ways that defense counsel may use the lessons of
negotiation theory to positively influence the plea bargain. In partic-
ular, defense counsel can work on creating a good relationship with
their negotiation counterparts,24 being well prepared at the negotia-
tion table,25 and maintaining an aspirational frame of mind.26 An-
other very important technique that they can use is researching and
using criteria, and in particular, criteria that is consistent with the
exercise of judicial guidance in curbing prosecutorial discretion.
While judicial involvement is not the only possible criteria to use,27
as we will see in Part III, using this information can allow defense
counsel to cabin prosecutorial discretion, and provides better gui-
dance than the status quo.
20. See Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 7, at 118.
21. Id. at 119.
22. Id.; see also DOUGLAS MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF
NEGOTIATION (1984); Albert Alschuler, The Changing Plea-bargaining Debate, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 652, 683 (1981); Rishi Batra, Lafler & Frye: A New Constitutional Standard
for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 310, 323 (2013).
23. Robert Scott & William Stuntz, Plea-Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1922 (1992).
24. See generally Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness
Considerations and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BAR-
RIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow, et. al, eds., 1999).
25. DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS, 19–24 (2007).
26. Id. at 36.
27. See infra Part III.
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B. Using Standards of Legitimacy in Negotiation
Legitimacy is one of the core concepts in the “Seven Elements”
framework of negotiation.28 The “Seven Elements” framework is a
comprehensive way to understand and analyze the terrain of any ne-
gotiation,29 and legitimacy is one of the important elements of this
terrain. As Bruce Patton explains, “legitimacy is a powerful motivat-
ing force in human relationships.” For a negotiation settlement to be
seen as fair, and for both sides to accept the agreement, parties must
perceive the outcome and process as legitimate.30 Negotiations often
fail if there is an absence of legitimacy.31 With this principle in mind,
negotiation texts have recommended that in order to promote a sense
of legitimacy or fairness in the negotiation process, negotiators
should research and propose external, neutral criteria to justify any
offers they make to the other side.32
Fisher and Ury, in their now classic text Getting to Yes, recom-
mend what they call “objective criteria” to bring a sense of legitimacy
to the proceedings.33 They define criteria as either a fair standard or
fair procedure that forms a basis independent of the will of the other
side for making a decision.34 There is often more than one fair stan-
dard that can be used in any negotiation, but Fisher and Ury suggest
using considerations such as “what a court would decide,” “prece-
dent,” “scientific judgment,” or “professional standards” to develop
such objective criteria.35 Similarly, Patton suggests asking what
standards a judge may apply and what “ought” to govern an agree-
ment but also encourages negotiators to prepare information on what
criteria the other side will argue for.36
After developing these criteria, negotiators can use them in a ne-
gotiation to accomplish several aims. First, criteria can justify a
28. Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 281
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005) (“The seven-elements framework
for understanding and analyzing negotiation . . . is one way to define comprehensively
the terrain of negotiation that needs to be understood and managed (whatever proce-




32. See, e.g., MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 25, at 34–36.
33. FISHER & URY, supra note 8, at 85. This Article will use the term “legitimate
criteria” instead, as there can be multiple criteria seen as objective.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Patton, supra note 28, at 287 (listing questions for each of the Seven
Elements).
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presented offer.37 Armed with criteria, negotiators can finish the
statement, “I would like to propose X because . . .” and it will be diffi-
cult for the other party to dismiss these offers out of hand as illegiti-
mate or unfair.38 Second, negotiating over criteria can help
negotiators choose among outcome options that have been proposed
in a fair manner.39
The use of legitimate criteria as outlined above can have several
positive impacts on the negotiation. As Fisher and Ury suggest, fo-
cusing on legitimacy and criteria can produce more “wise agree-
ment . . . efficiently.”40 Negotiators using such criteria benefit from
past experience by referring to precedent and community practice.41
They also spend less time making and then unmaking commit-
ments.42 Most importantly, using criteria can help avoid a constant
battle for dominance and can protect the relationship between the
negotiating parties.43 Using criteria can bring a sense of fairness to
the process and ultimately to the outcome.
C. Using Standards to Persuade
Defense counsel would be more interested in using criteria dur-
ing negotiation if, in addition to producing wise agreements more effi-
ciently and preserving the relationship, using criteria is helpful in
persuading prosecutors to accept defense counsel’s positions or at
least come closer to a more advantageous outcome for the defense.
While there has been some criticism of the idea of using criteria as a
negotiation strategy to reduce conflict,44 there is good reason to think
that bringing criteria to the negotiation table will be helpful for de-
fense counsel. It is true that prosecutors, in general, are perceived as
having more power than defense counsel in plea bargaining,45 but
using criteria to create legitimacy in a negotiation can help address
this imbalance and be effective in changing the prosecutor’s level of
37. MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 25, at 34–36.
38. Id.
39. FISHER & URY, supra note 8, at 86–87 (discussing how criteria such as fair
procedures can be used to have a third-party pick an outcome for the negotiation).




44. J. White, The Pros and Cons of “Getting to YES,” 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 117,
121 (1984) (suggesting that there are no truly “objective” criteria, that use of criteria
is “persuasive rationalization,” and indicating that in the context of plea bargaining,
criteria should be used persuasively).
45. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE
L.J. 1979 (1992).
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bargaining power.46 Several of the reasons criteria can be used for
persuasion are addressed below.
1. Changing the Perception of Prosecutors’ BATNA
Standards impact prosecutors’ perception of their best alterna-
tive to negotiated agreement (“BATNA”). Evidence of judicial stan-
dards for plea bargaining can influence prosecutors to change their
bargaining power by changing how they perceive a particular judge
would rule in the case.47 Attorneys on both sides regularly evaluate
the “bargaining chips” that are derived from “the outcome that the
law will impose if no agreement is reached.”48 Each attorney evalu-
ates his or her client’s alternatives if no plea deal is reached.49 This
analysis impacts how an attorney approaches a plea negotiation. The
worse the potential alternatives, the more one would expect a party
to pursue a negotiated bargain.50
In the case of plea bargaining, a trial on the merits of the case is
the most obvious alternative to a guilty plea.51 Prosecutors will mod-
ify their offers based on their perception of factors impacting likeli-
hood of success at trial, including the impact of legal rules on
evidentiary issues, the strengths or weaknesses of their case, and po-
tential jury attitudes or tendencies in a given location, among
others.52 They will also consider the qualities of the judge in the par-
ticular case.53 If a judge is or has been known to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in this area, this will impact the prosecutor’s
evaluation of what may happen to the case if taken to trial. If a par-
ticular judge is known to “overrule” prosecutors’ charging decisions
using the standards we outline below,54 prosecutors take this into ac-
count and modify their plea demands accordingly. If the prosecutor
perceives her case to be less “triable,” she will offer more favorable
46. Negotiation texts recommend strategies of using criteria, particularly against
more powerful opponents, in order to persuade. See, e.g., PETER D. JOHNSTON, NEGOTI-
ATING WITH GIANTS, 69–79 (2012).
47. FISHER & URY, supra note 8, at 99–100.
48. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 968 (1979) (discussing negotiation in the di-
vorce context).
49. Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 7, at 121.
50. MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 25, at 22–23.
51. Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 7, at 121.
52. Id. at 121.
53. Id. at 123.
54. See infra Part III.
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plea deals55 and may even be persuaded, in rare cases, to drop the
charges altogether.56
Of course, it is true that many plea bargain agreements have no
chance of being overruled by the judge and will be approved as a mat-
ter of course by trial judges.57 Even in these cases, however, the typi-
cal defense attorney will still benefit from using the criteria provided
by judges for the reasons below.
2. Leveraging the Power of Justification
One less obvious advantage of raising criteria to justify offers is
simply that raising criteria provides a justification for defense coun-
sel to make a demand. Research has shown that the simple step of
providing a justification for a demand, even a frivolous one, has the
power to induce compliance.58 In a fascinating study, researchers
shut down all but one of the copy machines in a library, causing long
lines to form at the remaining one. The experimenters compared two
types of asking when students were trying to convince people to allow
them to cut in front of them in the line. In one condition, the experi-
menter simply said, “Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the
Xerox machine?” Sixty percent of those approached this way allowed
the experimenter to cut in front of them. In the other condition, the
experimenter said, “Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the
Xerox machine because I have to make some copies?” Even though the
second approach added an entirely inane justification (as the purpose
of cutting in line at a copy machine is to make copies), providing a
reason induced compliance in ninety-three percent of subjects.59
The researchers for this study suggest that this technique is ef-
fective because humans are hardwired to accommodate the seemingly
legitimate demands of others, as doing so allows us to build mutually
rewarding relationships.60 People tend to resist demands imposed on
55. Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 7, at 124.
56. Id. at 125.
57. See, e.g., Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988) (recogniz-
ing most plea bargains are accepted by the trial judge); see also Commonwealth v.
Napper, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (noting that rejection of plea bargains
is so rare that burden should be on State to prove that it would have been rejected in
the case of erroneous plea bargaining).
58. Ellen Langer, et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The
Role of “Placebic” Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 635, 638 (1978).
59. Id. at 637–38.
60. See also MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 25, at 167–69
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them but will consider them if the asker thinks the demands are jus-
tified, because the asker may then be obligated to them in the fu-
ture.61 In order to make judgments about what demands are
legitimate, the authors suggest that humans use rules of thumb
rather than performing a full analysis, and the very existence of the
word “because” is often sufficient to gain compliance.62
Defense counsel, then, may find themselves at an advantage by
using norms for judicial exercise of prosecutorial discretion. They will
be able to better justify their offer and thus increase the likelihood
that prosecutors will not reject the offer out of hand. By saying, “I
think this offer is acceptable because . . .,”63 defense attorneys can
bolster their bargaining position and induce the same psychological
effect on their negotiation partners — prosecutors — as in any other
negotiation context. Much of what happens in a plea bargain also de-
pends on the chemistry between specific prosecutors and defense at-
torneys,64 who are often in repeat relationships with each other.
Defense counsels’ use of justification can persuade prosecutors to
grant legitimized demands and build a mutually rewarding relation-
ship for future plea bargains.
3. Allowing Them to Justify Decisions to Others
As Nicholas Herman notes in Plea Bargaining, prosecutors are
often motivated by considerations apart from the circumstances of
the plea bargain itself.65 Prosecutors may be motivated by political
considerations, such as attaining higher office, or personal considera-
tions such as whether their family members have been victims of a
similar crime.66 One other non-legal consideration that prosecutors
must take into account is their duty as employees to report their re-
sults to their supervisors.67 While this reporting is more salient for
more junior prosecutors, who may be evaluated on length of negoti-
ated sentences, it is also important for senior prosecutors who are
either elected or appointed by those subject to political pressures.
When negotiating with an agent in a principal-agent relationship, it
is important to understand the incentives created by that relation-
ship.68 In this case, the agency relationship will cause prosecutors
61. Id.
62. Id. (summarizing the research and extending advice to negotiators).
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. Michael Estrin, Pleading for Justice, CAL. LAWYER, Apr. 2014, at 20.
65. G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 2.02 (3d ed. 2012).
66. Id. at § 2.02(8).
67. Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty,” supra note 7, at 134.
68. ROBERT MNOOKIN, ET. AL., BEYOND WINNING 90 (2000).
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who are worried about their performance to consider how their super-
visors will evaluate any agreed-upon settlements. By using criteria to
justify offers, skilled defense counsel can help prosecutors with the
“behind the table” negotiation that prosecutors have with their own
supervisors,69 by arming prosecutors with reasons for why a particu-
lar sentence is justified.
4. Making an Appeal to Rational Analysis
Perhaps more importantly than the strategic factors addressed
above, prosecutors are more likely than lay negotiators to be per-
suaded by criteria based on judicial guidance because of their role as
a lawyer. Experienced lawyers temper their psychological biases with
knowledge of applicable law and legal standards.70 Using legal stan-
dards can appeal to lawyers’ abilities to apply a rational analysis to
determine whether a proposed settlement is consistent with out-
comes in similar cases.71 By raising the specter of how judges have
ruled on prosecutorial decisions, even where prosecutors have the
freedom to make their own decisions, defense lawyers can use the
mere existence of a legal standard or precedent to convince prosecu-
tors to adopt the persuasive authority of prior judicial opinions.
5. Encouraging Consideration of Their Judicial Role
The use of legal criteria — particularly when judges use criteria
typically considered only by prosecutors — will be particularly effec-
tive in influencing prosecutors, given their unique role in the justice
system. As Professor Albert Alschuler notes, one of the roles that
prosecutors take on is that of judge, because prosecutors must deter-
mine the “right thing” for the defendant in light of the defendant’s
particular circumstances.72 In this way, prosecutors differ from typi-
cal negotiation adversaries in a civil suit, in that prosecutors are mo-
tivated by and tasked with a quasi-judicial role, as well as that of an
advocate.73
Influencing prosecutors to consider not only their advocacy role
but also their judicial role will have a beneficial impact on the plea-
69. Id. at 178.
70. Nancy Welch, Perceptions on Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATORS FIELDBOOK 169
(Andrea Schnieder & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006).
71. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics & Settlement, 76
TEX. L. REV. 77, 122 (1997).
72. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 53 (1968).
73. Id. at 54; see also Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 193 (2007).
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bargaining negotiation for defense counsel. As noted in psychological
literature, negotiators tend to be motivated by self-interest, in which
their sense of fairness in the outcome is directly tied to their own
“egocentric bias.”74 People tend to look at facts from a self-serving
perspective.75 In one experiment studying the impact of egocentric
bias, subjects in a research study learned all the facts involved in a
personal injury accident in which a motorcyclist was hit by a car and
injured. If subjects were first told the role that they would play (ei-
ther cyclist or driver) and then asked to evaluate what a “fair” settle-
ment would be given the facts, each side evaluated the identical facts
in ways that served their own role, i.e., the drivers thought a low
settlement was appropriate, and cyclists felt a high one was more
fair.76
Unsurprisingly, subjects in this condition had a difficult time
reaching settlement when the negotiation was conducted. If subjects
were given the facts before being told their role, however, and then
asked to evaluate a fair settlement, they were more likely to come to
a settlement figure closer to others, and subsequent negotiations
were more successful.77 This outcome suggests that negotiators gen-
erally dealing with egocentric bias may be more successful by helping
the other side think more like a neutral party, such as a judge.
This principle is significant for defense counsel in particular. By
raising issues of what judges would feel is the right thing for a defen-
dant in similar circumstances, defense counsel can push prosecutors
to consider their quasi-judicial role rather than their role as advocate.
Prosecutors considering themselves in their quasi-judicial role are
more likely to evaluate the facts in a neutral fashion, as research has
shown that role-based considerations exert a strong influence on deci-
sion-making.78 This is especially true for how judges are influenced to
evaluate facts and consider outcomes in a more neutral fashion given
the role conception of a judge as neutral.79
74. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997); Welch, supra note 70,
at 168.
75. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 74, at 111.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 113–14.
78. See generally BRUCE J. BIDDLE, ROLE THEORY: EXPECTATIONS, IDENTITIES, AND
BEHAVIORS (1979).
79. For a discussion on the influence of the judicial role-conception on judging,
see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 312 (1990); James L. Gibson,
The Role Concept in Judicial Research, 3 L. & POL’Y Q. 291 (1981); Duncan Kennedy,
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518, 521 (1986).
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By explicitly bringing to light judicial involvement in the
prosecutorial role, defense counsel can encourage prosecutors to con-
sider the “judicial” way of exercising their discretion, and thereby
moderate the self-serving biases of an advocacy role.
III. TYPICAL PLEA BARGAINING STANDARDS
Thus far, we have argued for the use of criteria as a good negotia-
tion strategy for defense counsel in the plea bargaining context.80 Ju-
dicial exercise of prosecutorial discretion serves as a promising
source of objective criteria. Before we elaborate on the areas where
judges have exercised this type of discretion, it is important to evalu-
ate two existing criteria that one typically considers in the context of
plea bargaining: (1) what the sentence outcome would be if the case
went to trial and (2) what sentence other defendants have received
for similar crimes. Contrary to popular belief, these two criteria may
not actually provide a useful or helpful standard of legitimacy in the
plea bargaining context.
A. What the Sentence Would Be at Trial
One common conception of the standard by which to judge plea
bargains is the sentence to which the accused would be subjected to
at trial if convicted of the crime. This standard seems to comport with
the idea of using “what a court would decide” or “precedent” to legiti-
mize offers that one would make during the negotiation.81
Under this view, plea bargains are a way for defendants to reap a
discount off the sentencing guidelines for a particular crime in ex-
change for a guilty plea,82 in the same way that legal entitlements in
civil cases are used to guide settlement outcomes.83 While the poten-
tial sentence at trial is obviously an important piece of information
that defense counsel should gather before negotiating a plea bargain,
it may not provide a strategic advantage if used in the negotiation as
a criteria. Using the sentence at trial as criteria in the negotiation
can be disadvantageous because a concrete sentence can anchor the
80. Of course, criteria are not the only type of arguments that will persuade at
the bargaining table. Herman gives examples of other types of arguments that can
and do persuade at the bargaining table, including importantly, the evidentiary weak-
ness of the prosecutor’s case. HERMAN, supra note 65, at § 7.11.
81. This is further bolstered by the idea of sentencing guidelines, which seem to
provide clear outcomes for trials with results of guilty.
82. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1975 (1992); Scott & William J. Stuntz, supra note 23, 1913–17 (1992).
83. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 48.
Spring 2015] Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal Negotiations 77
negotiation at a point that is unfavorable for the defendant. An
anchor is a number or outcome that focuses the other negotiator’s at-
tention and expectation.84 The power of anchors is substantial and
affects even those with negotiation experience and expertise.85
Presuming that the plea negotiation is a discount from a the expected
sentence at trial, starting from this point may anchor the negotiation
at a high point and force the defense counsel to argue for downward
leniency, rather than starting from a lower point and encouraging the
prosecutor to bargain upwards.
In addition, as Professor Stephanos Bibas has shown, there are
many structural distortions and psychological pitfalls that make the
shadow of trial assumption in plea bargaining very questionable.86 In
particular, the “lumpiness” of statutory guidelines and existence of
mandatory statutory penalties make calibrating plea bargains
against this type of criteria very difficult.87 Because mandatory pen-
alties and statutory sentencing guidelines provide maxima and min-
ima for crimes based on the severity of the offense and the criminal
background of the defendant, rather than the strength of the evi-
dence or actual chance of conviction at trial, the particular outcome
at trial for a particular crime might not provide a guideline for a plea
in the case at hand.88
Furthermore, as many scholars have argued, trial sentences are
a form of coercive punishment rather than outcomes on which to base
sentencing. Trial sentences are not fair outcomes from which post-
plea sentences are discounted, based on the defendants’ willingness
to plead. Instead, the use of trial sentences as criteria serves as a
form of coercive punishment by extracting a penalty for those who
would exercise their right to trial.89 Viewed in this way, the trial out-
come is not a legitimate or fair criterion in the plea negotiation.
84. MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 25, at 27–28.
85. Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Es-
tate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 OR-
GANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 90 (1987).
86. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2546 (2004).
87. Id. at 2486–91.
88. Id.
89. See Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining:
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 603–05 (2014); see also
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 992 (2005) (finding trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to four
hundred sixty-one percent, depending on the state and offense); see generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
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Rather, the threat of possible trial outcomes is merely an overly
harsh measure that forces defendants to forgo trial rights.
B. What Other Defendants Have Received for the Same Crime
One other piece of information that would seem to be useful as a
legitimate criterion is the sentence that is usually offered in a plea
bargain for the type of crime or crimes of which that defendant is
being accused. Scholars have referred to this criterion as the going
“price” of the crime, and both scholars90 and practitioner guides91
suggest that it is a key piece of information defense counsel needs to
acquire before entering plea bargain negotiations.
Clearly, defense counsel should try to acquire this information.
As noted by many scholars, however, the going “price” of a crime var-
ies by jurisdiction92 and may not be readily available.93 Because the
negotiation of plea bargains is hidden from public view, it is difficult
to acquire information on the factors that go into an individual plea
bargain outcome.94 Even so, more experienced defense counsel may
have access to better information in this area,95 and aggregate infor-
mation about the “going rate” can help moderate a particular prose-
cutor’s personal biases, including the prosecutor’s passion for the
case, type of crime96 or the prosecutor’s current workload.97
Because the going rate may be hard to acquire, defense counsel
should also explore other worthwhile sources that can provide stan-
dards of legitimacy. Judges occasionally exercise their powers to offer
standards that defense lawyers can use in negotiations as criteria
created by respected third-party commentators on the appropriate
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.98
FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf.
90. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1959–60; see also Batra et al., supra note 22,
at 326.
91. HERMAN, supra note 65, at § 7.09.
92. Id.
93. Bibas, supra note 86, at 2481.
94. Id. at 2475. Scholars have proposed increasing transparency in plea bargain-
ing negotiation by creating a database of plea bargaining outcomes. See id. at 2532;
Batra et. al, supra note 22 at 333–35.
95. Id.; see also Batra et al., supra note 22 at 333 (suggesting that defense coun-
sel from public defenders’ offices have access to shared information and that lawyers
also share this information over group email lists).
96. HERMAN, supra note 65, at § 2.02(8).
97. See generally Burke, supra note 73.
98. See infra Part IV.
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IV. EXERCISES OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION INFORM THE APPROPRIATE
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
When judges exercise the type of discretion typically assigned to
prosecutors, they, as neutral and informed contributors to the legal
discourse, provide insight on the way prosecutors do and should go
about exercising their discretion. Judges do exercise broad discretion,
but more often, statutory or common law provides standards that ex-
plain how discretion should be exercised. There are, however, times
when judges temper the rigidity of the criminal law in ways that are
not governed by any sort of pre-existing rule or norm. When judges do
so, they engage in the same type of discretion prosecutors routinely
exercise. Defense lawyers should look to the reasoning of courts when
they exercise this type of discretion as a respected source on the ap-
propriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
In explaining their decisions when they have power resembling
prosecutors, judges provide guidance for subsequent exercises of
prosecutorial power. Courts can fashion soft constraints on prosecu-
tors by being more forward in taking opportunities to explain how
they are exercising their prosecutorial-style powers.
Existing laws provide limited opportunities for judges to exercise
prosecutorial-style discretion, but the opportunities do exist. De
minimis statutes permit judges in some states to dismiss charges al-
leging minor infractions of laws. Judges occasionally may review a
prosecutor’s rationale in denying pretrial diversion. In each of these
circumstances, judges have an opportunity to second-guess the deci-
sion of a prosecutor to force a citizen to answer a charge, especially
where there is reason to believe that the law has not been violated.
Some judicial sentencing decisions similarly involve considera-
tion of issues typically left to prosecutors. Under California’s three-
strikes law, judges may consider whether a defendant’s present or
past crimes were appropriately charged as felonies rather than mis-
demeanors. In the past, when courts departed from the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, they were required to find circumstances in the
case that were unaccounted for by the broad scope of those Guide-
lines. In many capital sentencing schemes, appellate courts are asked
whether a death sentence is proportionate to the crime, even though
the aggravating factors supporting the sentence have been appropri-
ately found. In each of these situations, courts must contemplate
questions that are typically outside judicial consideration, un-
governed by legal standards, and typically left to the discretion of
prosecutors.
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Judges further venture into the sphere of prosecutorial discre-
tion when they review proposed plea bargains and craft remedies for
situations in which defendants have received ineffective assistance of
counsel during plea bargaining. In extreme cases where judges be-
lieve prosecutors have extended too much leniency, judges may sec-
ond-guess agreements crafted by the prosecutors. When judges create
remedies for ineffective plea bargaining, they are forbidden to grant
the defendant anything that would amount to a windfall. When de-
fendants reject offers and go to trial because of constitutionally un-
reasonable advice, courts must determine which portion of the
rejected plea constituted a windfall and thus must decide the extent
to which instrumental and equitable decisions were part of the lost
offer. To make these decisions, courts must reconstruct the motiva-
tions behind plea offers. In doing so, courts provide guidance to prose-
cutors regarding appropriate amounts of leniency.
The rarity of such decisions certainly limits their use as stan-
dards of legitimacy, but there is an unrealized potential for these de-
cisions to inform negotiations. In rendering these decisions, courts
offer categories of equitable factors that prosecutors ought to consider
in deciding whether to grant leniency. Of course in doing so, judges
are helping to define only one justification for plea offers. Prosecutors
offer leniency in criminal negotiations for a variety of reasons: to
hedge the risk of losing,99 to preserve prosecutorial and judicial re-
sources,100 to spare victims the time and toll of testifying,101 to obtain
cooperation from the defendant,102 and to provide a just result.103
Judges no doubt have instrumental views in mind as they exercise
99. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L.
REV. 551, 556 (2013).
100. See Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the
Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. L. REV. 239, 279 (2011) (noting that “plea deals necessa-
rily permit the government to preserve resources that may then be utilized in other
cases”).
101. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of
Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 643, 687 (2010) (observing
that a district attorney indicated that her decision to accept a plea in a capital case
was motivated in part to spare the victims “years of suffering”); Ronald F. Wright,
Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 79, 80 (2005) (noting that “some crime victims sound relieved that the plea bar-
gain spares them from the prolonged ordeal of a trial”).
102. Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1992).
103. See Alschuler, supra note 72, at 53.
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this discretion104 but, by the nature of the judicial role, their deci-
sions to grant mercy will more often be driven by equitable than in-
strumental considerations. Judges have no occasion to discount
sentences for fear of acquittal or to prevent the toll of a trial on vic-
tims.105 They may reward guilty pleas in order to encourage more of
them as they have an interest in conserving resources,106 but when
they exercise their discretion in a way typically limited to prosecu-
tors, their role places them in a better institutional position to evalu-
ate the equities of a defendant’s case than as an advocate against the
defendant.107
Prosecutors are entrusted with a difficult dual role of judge and
advocate in the American criminal justice system.108 On the one
hand, they are to seek results that are just, but as advocates against
104. Federal judges, for instance, determine how much of a reduction will be
granted for cooperation under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; see Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 167 (1994).
105. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 467 So. 2d 447, 449 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(Florida did not prohibit judges from making plea offers but “the practice . . . of ‘dis-
counting’ an appropriate sentence in light of the weaknesses of the state’s case or the
likelihood of its losing—is one which is uniquely prosecutorial in nature and, very
arguably, ought not to be engaged in by a judicial officer, who must be seen to be an
objective arbiter between the two sides, with no apparent interest in the outcome of
the case or, more specifically, in whether a particular defendant is convicted.”). Flor-
ida and Connecticut are unique in permitting judicial participation in plea bargaining
and the case law in these jurisdictions thus offers unique insights into the ways prose-
cutors and judges view the goals of negotiated settlements. See generally Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (2006).
106. See The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sen-
tence, 66 YALE L. J. 204, 209 (1956) (observing that judges discounted a defendant’s
punishment when he pled “because of the aid of his plea in the efficient administra-
tion of justice”).
107. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124 (1998) (“Most commonly, in all likelihood, the prosecutor
simply accepts the results of the police investigation . . . .”). Judges, thus, because of
their institutional position are less partial to either side. See Turner, supra note 105
at 256–66 (arguing that judicial involvement in plea bargaining can make the process
more fair and accurate).
108. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991) (describing dual
role of prosecutors as advocates and ministers of justice). But see, Amie N. Ely,
Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum’s Curtail-
ment of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORN. L. REV. 237 (2004) (describ-
ing John Ashcroft’s requirement that federal prosecutors pursue the “most serious,
readily provable offense”); Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentenc-
ing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2067–68 (2006) (observing that Ashcroft memoran-
dum appears to have had little effect on actual charging practices of United States
Attorneys’ Offices).
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the accused, their natural tendency is to see the defendant in the
worst possible light.109 Prosecutors may not, therefore, have the best
perspective of the unique circumstances of the defendant’s crime, or
of facts in the defendant’s background, that call for leniency. Of the
reasons for granting leniency in exchange for a plea, these equitable
considerations are the most important, as they relate to how the de-
fendant should be punished.
We offer below examples of scenarios when judges have opportu-
nities to exercise this sort of discretion, even though practically these
vehicles are seldom used. Ideally, judges will increasingly exercise
their authority in these areas as they recognize that their role in ren-
dering such decisions will provide advisory criteria to the essentially
unregulated power of prosecutors to charge and negotiate. Even a
small number of prosecutorial-type decisions provides a basis for be-
ginning to discuss the appropriate equitable factors to be considered
in charging and bargaining decisions.
A. De Minimis Statutes
A substantial minority of states have statutes permitting courts
to decide that a minor infraction of the law should not be prosecuted
at all. Fifteen states have statutes that permit judges to dismiss pros-
ecutions if the acts committed amount to de minimis infractions of
the law or if dismissal would be “in the interests of justice.”110
Neither the term “de minimis” nor its counterpart, “interests of jus-
tice,” lends itself to an obvious meaning. At least in principle, how-
ever, de minimis statutes give judges very broad power to dismiss a
criminal prosecution when he or she deems it inequitable to proceed
with the action, even though the evidence in this case is sufficient for
a conviction.111 Judges in these jurisdictions, however, rarely exer-
cise the authority they are given under these statutes.112
No traditional legal standards govern a judge’s ability to dismiss
under these statutes. Of course, the notion of a traditional legal stan-
dard is antithetical to the idea of a de minimis statute. If de minimis
109. See DANIEL MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 2–3 (2012).
110. See James L. Buchwalder, Dismissal of State Criminal Charges in Further-
ance of, or in the Interest of, Justice, 71 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1999); Kent Greenawalt, Con-
flicts of Law and Morality—Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177, 231
n.118 (1981).
111. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 211 (1982) (describing de minimis statutes).
112. See People v. Schellenbach, 888 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (ob-
serving that dismissals in the interest of justice should be rare).
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statutes created rules that could be readily applied to a range of
cases, then the statute would essentially redefine the meaning of
criminal statutes. Courts generally dismiss cases under this statute
only after considering all of the facts of the crime alleged as well as
the circumstances of the defendant’s life more generally.113 In that
way, legislatures direct judges to engage in precisely the sort of con-
siderations assigned to prosecutors.114 As two commentators have de-
scribed, “De minimis or ‘interests of justice’ statutes reflect a
legislative will to recognize judicial authority to oversee executive
prosecutorial discretion — one example of a checks-and-balances
framework with which to achieve ultimate justice.”115 Unlike prose-
cutors, however, judges dismissing cases under de minimis statutes
must provide reasons for their actions and their decisions are often
made public.116 Many states expressly require judges dismissing
cases under de minimis statutes, or under analogous rules or statutes
permitting dismissals “in the interests of justice” to provide their rea-
sons in writing.117
Some legislatures have shown reluctance to give judges broad
discretion to dismiss de minimis cases. Only fifteen states have
adopted de minimis-style statutes. Five adopted the version first de-
veloped with the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
(“MPC”) in 1962.118 Ten other states have since enacted vaguely-
113. See Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crimes and the
“De Minimis” Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 53–60 (1997).
114. One Connecticut case illustrates this well. In State v. Jimenez-Jaramill, 38
A.3d 239 (Conn. App. 2012), the Court concluded that a trial court’s decision to dis-
miss a prosecution in which the prosecution could obtain at most a $75.00 fine during
the direct testimony of the witness violated separation of powers concerns. The trial
court concluded that the minor potential fine did not justify the time and expense of a
trial. The appellate court reasoned that this was an inappropriate intrusion into the
province of the prosecutor as the trial court did not conclude that it was dismissing on
the basis of Connecticut’s de minimis statute and in the absence of such authority,
respect for separation of powers prevented the Court from dismissing on this ground.
115. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Kargar and the Existing Frame-
work for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 846 (1999).
116. As judges are reluctant to dismiss under de minimis statutes, because such
statutes are frequently seen as interfering with the prerogative of the prosecutor,
when they choose to do so, they are likely to provide more-thorough-than-usual rea-
soning. See id. at 850 (“One judge’s proper exercise of discretion is another judge’s
impermissible arbitrary act.”).
117. Pomorski, supra, note 113 at 82–83; People v. Hatch, 991 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal,
App. 2000); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(3); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A,
§ 12(2); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312(b) (West 2014). Courts have recognized that
the statement of reasons need not be formalistic, but reasons must be provided. Peo-
ple v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. 1983).
118. See Buchwalder, supra note 110; Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Mo-
rality — Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177, 231 n.118 (1981).
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worded statutes that permit trial court judges to dismiss a prosecu-
tion “in the interests of justice.”119
The MPC’s version of the statute demonstrates the lack of tradi-
tional legal standards:
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defen-
dant’s conduct:
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither ex-
pressly negatived by the person whose interest was infringed
nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the of-
fense; or
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only
to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of convic-
tion; or
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably
be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the
offense.
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3)
of this Section without filing a written statement of its
reasons.120
Even the drafters of these provisions were unsure exactly how to
describe the appropriate operation of the terms they had drafted. In
the MPC commentary, the drafters of the de minimis statute con-
cluded that the first provision is essentially a variation of the defense
of consent.121 Professor Wechsler offered two examples of circum-
stances to which this defense would apply: trespassing on land where
the owners traditionally permitted strangers to pass and picking up a
newspaper from a stand lacking the ability to pay with the intention
of paying the following day.122 As Professor Staislaw Pomorski recog-
nized, however, the defense of consent is provided in another provi-
sion of the Model Penal Code and provides all that is needed to
provide a defense for the acts described by Professor Wechsler.123
119. See Buchwalder, supra note 110; see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West
2015) (“The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in the furtherance of justice, order an
action to be dismissed.”)
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12.
121. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 2.12 cmt. 2 at 402 (1985).
122. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 2.12 cmt. 2 at 402 (1985); see also
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, § 67(b), at 323 (1984).
123. See Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crimes and the
“De Minimis” Defense, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 51, 54–55.
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Professor Pomorski concluded that this defense must be described as
society’s willingness to tolerate the defendant’s conduct, not the
victim’s.124
While the drafters of the statute were unclear about the meaning
of the model statute they created, they were much clearer about the
purpose of the statute. Herbert Wechsler, the principal author of the
Model Penal Code, described the de minimis statute as giving judges
an opportunity to engage in the prosecutorial function of deciding
that even though a prosecution may be brought, it should not be
brought:
Nothing is more common in criminal law enforcement, of course,
than the exercise on the part of the prosecutor — and grand ju-
ries, where they exist — of a kind of unarticulated authority to
mitigate the general provisions of the criminal law to prevent
absurd applications. Currently, this decision occurs in in camera
or an out-of-court process. Although this general practice is gen-
erally accepted as necessary to criminal law administration, it
has been a general purpose of the Code to bring this practice
somewhat further into the open. The only way to do that seems
to be to vest in the court a kind of power analogous to the gen-
eral dispensing power which is now exercised in practice by the
organs of administration.125
Certainly the Model Penal Code did not transfer power to judges
to exclusively determine whether a prosecution should be declined. In
what sense, then, did the power of a judge to decide that a particular
case should not be brought bring prosecutorial discretion “out in the
open”? It is possible that Wechsler meant for the provision to serve a
public relations function alone. In dismissing cases under the de
minimis statute, perhaps he meant for courts to explain what prose-
cutors do in most cases, but chose not to do in this particular case. It
seems more likely, however, that Wechsler intended this statute to
provide a public forum to publicly discuss the appropriate exercise of
discretion by prosecutors when they consider declining a particular
case. The effect of such a statute is to provide a venue for judges to
discuss when prosecutors should and should not bring charges.
With similar effect to the MPC’s de minimis statute, ten states
have provisions that permit criminal prosecutions to be dismissed “in
the interests of justice.”126 New York’s provision, for instance, is
124. Id.
125. Discussion of the Model Penal Code, 39 A.L.I. Proc. 61, 105 (1962).
126. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.21 (West 2015); MONT. STAT. ANN. § 46-13-401
(West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 10, § 8.3 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. tit. 14 § 135.755
(2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 2015); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c) (2014); IDAHO
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multi-faceted, resembling the judicial interpretation of the de
minimis statute in other states. In New York, a prosecution can be
dismissed in the interests of justice after a consideration of:
(1) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(2) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(3) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at
trial;
(4) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(5) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement
personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the
defendant;
(6) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sen-
tence authorized for the offense;
(7) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community;
(8) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in
the criminal justice system;
(9) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the
complainant or victim with respect to the motion;
(10) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of convic-
tion would serve no useful purpose.127
As with de minimis statutes, there have been few cases of dis-
missing charges in the interests of justice. Entire cases, however,
have been dismissed “in the interests of justice.” When crimes are
relatively minor, courts have demonstrated (an admittedly rare) will-
ingness to dismiss cases where: (1) defendants lack criminal his-
tory;128 (2) the defendant nearly missed having a defense;129 (3) the
defendant was suffering from a terminal disease;130 (4) the defendant
R. CRIM. P. 48(a)(2) (1979); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 210.40 (1986); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25
(2014); VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)(2) (2014); Wanderer & Connors, supra note 115 at 829
n.67.
127. McKinney’s Crim. P. L. § 210.40 (N.Y.)
128. See People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (prostitution
case); People v. Ben Levi, 595 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990) (protestors causing
no harm).
129. People v. AT, 589 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (defendant distributed
hypodermic needles without drugs in them to prevent the spread of disease).
130. People v. Herman L., 639 N.E.2d 404 (N.Y. 1994) (sale of controlled substance
by HIV-positive defendant); People v. Camargo, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (sale of drugs by now-bedridden HIV-positive defendant). But see People v.
Sherman, 825 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (no evidence that defendant’s seri-
ous medical condition was deteriorating and defendant had extensive criminal re-
cord); People v. Pender, 593 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (felony charges should
not be dismissed as a result of even terminal illness as this would provide a license for
terminally ill to commit crimes); People v. Sierra, 566 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990) (fact that defendant resumed drug sales after being diagnosed with AIDS virus
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suffered from a medical condition that offered some explanation for
the crime;131 (5) the defendant’s medical condition rendered the trial
of the case difficult;132 (6) the parties have reconciled;133 (7) the facts
of the case did fit the crime as traditionally understood.134 Despite
the claimed effects that a conviction would have on an otherwise suc-
cessful career, courts have, with some frequency, considered but re-
jected requests to dismiss less-than-serious crimes in the interests of
justice in these situations.135
The difficulty in defining a standard for dismissing less-than-se-
rious infractions of the law certainly does not mean that there are not
cases that judges should dismiss — and reasonable prosecutors
should not charge in the first place. Rather, the difficulty in creating
a legal standard to identify these cases merely demonstrates that de
mimimis statutes entrust courts with the same sort of difficult-to-de-
fine discretion given to prosecutors. Easy cases for dismissal, how-
ever, are not hard to imagine. Historically, prosecutions of unmarried
adults under the Mann Act for crossing state lines to have sex could
have been appropriately dismissed under the de minimis statute as
society has long tolerated this conduct.136
suggested that he would not be able to restrain himself from criminal conduct in the
future); People v. Murray, 634 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (defendant was not
in advanced stage of the disease).
131. People v. Doe, 602 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993) (defendant had im-
paired hearing and severe learning disability that caused her to believe she needed to
defend her sister).
132. People v. Reets, 597 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (defendant’s impaired
hearing would have made it difficult to try this non-serious case).
133. State v. Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125 (Ohio 1996); Commonwealth v. Hatfield, 593
A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
134. People v. Sales, 563 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (defendant, charged
with robbery, took small amount of food from officer undercover as delivery man and
made obscene gesture); People v. Felderman, 852 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008)
(principal interfered with officer trying to arrest student to get officer to take student
out back door of school to avoid disruption to school and embarrassment of student);
People v. Schaker, 670 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1998) (injury in “no checking”
hockey game after buzzer).
135. People v. Crespo, 665 N.Y.S.2d 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (defendant accused
of robbery had recently joined Marine Corps); People v. Figueroa, 625 N.Y.S.2d 839
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1995); People v. Kelley, 529 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (police
officer charged with driving while intoxicated); People v. Stern, 372 N.Y.S.2d 932
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (successful real estate broker claimed he had much to lose in a
criminal conviction); State v. Stough, 939 P.2d 652 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
trial court improperly dismissed heroin charge in the interests of justice based on
defendant’s status as Vietnam veteran).
136. 36 Stat. 825 (1910); 18 U.S.C. § 397–404; see also Note, Interstate Immorality:
The Mann Act and the Supreme Court, 56 YALE L.J. 718 (1947) (describing act).
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Although the statute was clearly intended to prevent trafficking
of prostitutes, the plain language of the statute covered conduct that
was hardly criminal at the time of drafting and is certainly not crimi-
nal today.137 Indeed, prosecutions of consenting adults under this
statute were extraordinarily rare even in the early days of the statute
and are non-existent in the past few decades.138 A modern example of
a case that could be dismissed under this provision is a child pornog-
raphy prosecution for sexting (sending nude images via text) by an
underage person to an underage romantic partner.139 Possession of
such images carries substantial penalties under the strict letter of
137. See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of
Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 33 (1996) (“A
principal motive for passage of the Mann Act, for example, was not simply that white
women were being tricked, drugged, and kidnapped into prostitution, as anti-white
slavery activists contended, but also that they were being forced into prostitution
where they would be used for the benefit of at least some black men.”).
138. One of the rare prosecutions of consenting adults under the Mann Act reveals
that the statute was used as a pretext to enforce other societal mores. Jack Johnson
was a prominent and wealthy African-American boxer who, well before interracial
relationships were accepted, had relationships with Caucasian women. He was suc-
cessfully prosecuted under the Mann Act for taking a trip to Florida with his fiancée,
a woman he later married. See generally THOMAS R. HIETALA, THE FIGHT OF THE CEN-
TURY: JACK JOHNSON, JOE LOUIS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2002); De-
nise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of the Black Community, 32 AKRON L.
REV. 529 (1999). This story is the subject of a wonderful documentary by Ken Burns
entitled Unforgiveable Blackness: The Rise and Fall of Jack Johnson, and Sen. John
McCain has lead an effort to have Johnson pardoned. See Barak Y. Orbach, The John-
son-Jeffries Fight 100 Years Thence: The Johnson-Jeffries Fight and Censorship of
Black Supremacy, 5 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 270, 272–73 n.7 (2010).
When constitutional rights are implicated by the state’s decision to punish, courts
have looked at the rarity of enforcement as a factor suggesting the illegitimacy of the
punishment. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for
juveniles violates Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (exe-
cution of juveniles contrary to Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) (execution of mentally retarded contrary to Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (rarity of enforcement of sodomy laws factor in concluding
punishing private conduct is unlawful); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty for rape violates the Eighth Amendment as only two states have retained it).
139. See W. Jesse Weins & Todd C. Hiestand, Sexting, Statutes, and Saved By the
Bell: Introducing a Lesser Juvenile Charge With an “Aggravating Factors” Frame-
work, 77 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4–16 (2009). In a particularly egregious case, prosecutors in
Manassas, Virginia charged a seventeen year old with possession of child pornogra-
phy for sending a naked video of himself to his fifteen year old girlfriend after she sent
similar pictures to him. While there have been a handful of cases charged this way
throughout the country, this case was particularly outrageous because prosecutors
obtained a warrant to take a picture of the young man’s erect penis and, to ensure the
erection, the court order they successfully sought permitted him to be injected with a
substance to guarantee the arousal desired for the photo comparison. See Tom Jack-
man, In ‘Sexting’ Case Manassas City Police Want to Photograph Teen in Sexually
Explicit Manner, Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, July 9, 2014.
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the law, and despite the pervasiveness of the conduct, a few prosecu-
tors have actually sought felony charges for child pornography for the
sender and/or receiver of these images.140
Courts considering requests to dismiss under de minimis stat-
utes often consider the totality of the circumstances, precisely the
sort of analysis that typifies prosecutorial charging and plea bargain-
ing decisions. Even though the second prong of the de minimis stat-
ute considers only the seriousness of threatened or actual harm
related to the offense, courts applying this provision frequently look
to every aspect of the crime as well as the defendant’s general back-
ground.141 A New Jersey Superior Court concluded that “[e]very sur-
rounding fact is entitled to consideration, not for its sympathetic
import, but for such legitimate influence it may have in honoring leg-
islative intent.”142 The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s
decision to dismiss a case under the de minimis statute because the
lower court had not considered all of the factors that must be consid-
ered.143 Those factors, developed by Court to interpret the vague Ha-
waii law, included:
(1) the defendant’s background, experience, and character as in-
dications of whether he or she knew or should have known the
law was being violated,
(2) the defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of the act,
(3) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
(4) the harm or evil caused or threatened,
(5) the probable impact on the community,
(6) the seriousness of the punishment,
(7) possible improper motives of the prosecutor, and
(8) any other information that may reveal the nature and degree
of culpability.144
The vague language of the de minimis statute has left courts to
consider this wide variety of factors, which certainly do not form the
sort of legal test that a court typically considers outside the context of
140. Interestingly, some of these prosecutions were initiated in Pennsylvania that
has a de minimis statute, but none of the cases appear to have been dismissed on this
ground. See generally Weins & Hiestand, supra note 139.
141. Two other approaches are also used. One approach looks only to the harm
caused, or potentially caused, by the crime. The other looks at the harm caused, or
potentially harmed, and the defendant’s mens rea. See Pomorski, supra note 121 at
98.
142. State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
143. State v. Park, 525 P.2d 586, 591 (Haw. 1974).
144. Id.
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sentencing.145 Instead, these are precisely the sort of factors that
prosecutors consider in deciding whether to bring charges, how seri-
ous the charges should be, and what sort of plea bargain to offer.
The limited universe of cases dealing with de minimis statutes
has produced little consistency, but a number of equitable principles
have seemed to emerge. Thus far, courts have used these vague stan-
dards to dismiss less-than-serious cases where: (1) there is a debata-
ble question as to whether the facts constitute a crime at all;146
(2) the effect conviction for a minor crime would have on the life of a
productive citizen;147 (3) the role the victim played in the minor of-
fense;148 (4) the appropriateness of handling this matter in criminal,
as opposed to civil court;149 (5) non-criminal consequences a
145. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1287–93. Capital sentencing juries are required
to consider such a broad range of factors in mitigation. See Emily Hughes, Arbitrary
Death: An Empirical Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581, 590 (2012)
(describing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) which permits defendants to present
any evidence in mitigation of capital sentencing).
146. State of New Jersey v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.J. 1995) (defendant ver-
bally harassed victim); Commonwealth v. Houck, 335 A.2d 389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)
(charge of using “lewd, lascivious, or indecent words or language” for saying in a
phone call that alleged victim was “lower than dirt,” “morally rotten,” and ought to be
kicked out of his church and the Masons).
147. State v. Zarilli, 523 A.2d 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (defendant
shoplifted bubble gum; court should consider “the value to society of a citizen who is
not tainted with a conviction of criminal or disorderly conduct”); State v. Smith, 480
A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
148. State v. Nevens, 485 A.2d 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (casino em-
ployees rushed customer in all you-can-eat buffet to leave, prompting him to take a
piece of fruit); Commonwealth v. Moll, 543 A.2d 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting
feud between defendant and local township over drain pipe that defendant had to
puncture to prevent flooding of his property).
149. Moll, 543 A.2d at 1225 (observing that this matter would be best handled in
civil court). There is another explanation to the Moll case. In Moll, the defendant
intentionally cut a hole in a poorly functioning drain pipe that the city installed on his
property to prevent flooding on his own property. The defendant argued that he did
not cut the pipe with malice, meaning that he committed the act to preserve his own
property, not to injure city’s property. The court observed that there is no accepted
definition of malice and that the statute required only an intentional or reckless act
and the defendant admitted cutting a drain pipe he knew to have been installed by
the city. In essence, the defendant was arguing that something like the necessity de-
fense negated malice. Professor William Stuntz has suggested that vague terms such
as malice gave judges and juries discretion that they lack under the Model Penal Code
to balance the harshness of the law. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 266–67 (2011). The defendant unsuccessfully
made a similar claim in State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987), that his inten-
tional shooting of his dying father in the hospital was not done with malice. In the
limited context of minor cases, the Moll case seems to stand for the proposition that
malice does provide judges’ discretion to take individual circumstances into
consideration.
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defendant would otherwise suffer;150 (6) the absence of threatened or
actual physical harm; (7) necessity due to financial hardship;151 or
(8) the defendant’s criminal activity was related to his drug use.152
These cases can be used by defense lawyers to identify grounds for
encouraging prosecutorial leniency.
Not surprisingly, courts have reached very different conclusions
on whether similar cases should be dismissed.153 Even when rules
provide substantial guidance, reasonable jurists can do disagree on
the proper outcome.154 The presence of inconsistent judicial opinions
obviously undermines the persuasive authority of these opinions for
prosecutors. However, there is still real value to having inconsistent
opinions. Dissenting voices in the law are not without significance.
Often appellate courts contain dissenting opinions that resonate de-
spite majority opinions to the contrary. A judicially-announced opin-
ion describing an appropriate basis for prosecutorial leniency, even if
other judges have a different view, provides grounding for a defense
lawyer’s argument for mercy.
B. Three-Strikes Laws
While courts have rarely considered the application of de
minimis statutes, or statutes permitting dismissal in the interests of
justice, California courts have frequently considered whether one of
the defendant’s felonies ought to count toward his sentencing under
150. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 510 A.2d 1389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (inmates who
obstructed the ability of correctional officers to respond to a stabbing could be ade-
quately addressed by discipline within the prison).
151. People v. Perez, 553 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
152. People v. Ortiz, 544 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People v. Anderson,
612 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App Div. 1994).
153. See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal
Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393, 431–32 (1988) (observing that courts have arrived
at polar opposite conclusions in evaluating the de minimis statute).
154. The United States Supreme Court, for instance, typically agrees to hear cases
only after a circuit conflict has developed, meaning that judges, who have been ap-
pointed by the President and approved by the Senate, to occupy the second-highest
judicial positions in the nation, have arrived at different conclusions about the law.
See Michael F. Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction
in Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1989) (observing that “the
existence of a conflict remains the key factor in the certiorari decision.”).
92 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 20:61
its three-strikes law.155 While California’s three-strikes law has got-
ten the most attention, at least three other states have adopted provi-
sions that give trial judges similar discretion to determine whether
mandatory minimums apply.156
Three-strikes provisions, which mandate substantial minimum
penalties for a defendant’s third felony conviction, have existed in the
United States since the 1960s, long before California’s three-strikes
law began attracting national attention.157 Predecessors to Califor-
nia’s law were in fact much more draconian and afforded sentencing
judges no discretion to give the defendant anything other than life in
prison once the third felony had been charged and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.158
Despite being less draconian than its predecessors, California’s
three-strikes law is perhaps the best known. This notoriety may stem
from the Golden State’s high-profile crime policy and the Eighth
Amendment challenge of the law before the Supreme Court.159 Before
Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court twice considered far less for-
giving three-strikes statutes: Oyler v. Boles160 and Bordenkircher v.
Hayes.161 In Oyler, the Court determined that a three-strikes law was
155. One commentator has concluded that California courts have rarely found one
of the strikes should not count toward sentencing. See generally Alex Ricciardulli, The
Broken Safety Valve: Judicial Discretion’s Failure to Ameliorate Punishment Under
California’s Three Strikes Law, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2002). The universe of cases, even
in this single jurisdiction, however, seems considerably greater than the number of
cases nationally dismissing cases in the interests of justice, or under analogous de
minimis statutes.
156. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 465–68 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a–40 (West
2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2012).
157. See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion, Prosecution, the Logic of
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 396–97 (2008)
(describing the Oyler case).
158. See STUNTZ, supra note 13 at 257–58.
159. See Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial
Activism California’s Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2004) (observing
that “[f]rom its inception California’s Three Strikes Law has gained national atten-
tion.”); John E. Pfaff, The Continued Validity of Structured Sentencing Following
Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 245 (2006)
(noting high profile of three strikes laws generally but observing that California is the
only state to regularly apply this law). There are other reasons why California’s law
has received so much notice. Some 40,000 inmates in California have had their
sentences enhanced as a result of this law. Justice Anthony Kennedy has described
the political process that led to the three-strikes law as “sick.” See Michael A. Ro-
mano, Divining the Spirit of the Three Strikes Law, 22 FED. SENT’G. REP. 171, 172
(2010).
160. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
161. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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constitutional even though the facts presented to the Court suggested
that only a small minority of eligible defendants received third-strike
enhancements and the defendant’s case seemed less aggravated than
those not receiving enhancement.162 In Bordenkircher, the Supreme
Court found it constitutional for a prosecutor to threaten a third-
strike enhancement if a defendant did not accept five years of hard-
labor for a relatively minor third offense.163 Under the statutes at
issue in Oyler and Bordenkircher, judges had no discretion to decide
that a defendant who had three felony convictions should receive any-
thing other than a life sentence.164
In contrast, the Supreme Court explained in Ewing v. California
that under California’s three-strikes law, judges have extraordinary
discretion to determine whether the current offense, or any of the
prior offenses, should count toward the three strikes.165 In Ewing,
the trial court did not exercise its discretion to reduce the felony
charge for theft of $1200 worth of golf clubs to a misdemeanor, which
would have avoided the twenty-five year mandatory minimum sen-
tence slated for this offense.166
Under California’s three-strikes law, if a defendant has prior “se-
rious” or “violent” felony convictions, then the defendant is sentenced
to twice the penalty he or she would have otherwise received.167 If a
defendant has two or more of such prior convictions, then the defen-
dant is sentenced to “an indeterminate term of life imprisonment,”
with parole eligibility after the greater of: (1) three times the term
provided for the current offense, (2) twenty-five years, or (3) the
length of time determined by the court based on certain statutory en-
hancements.168 Prosecutors are required to allege these prior convic-
tions in the charging document in order for these sentencing
enhancements to apply.169
But California judges are not required to sentence defendants
under the enhanced penalties provided by the three-strikes law. A
sentencing judge may conclude that “in light of the nature and cir-
cumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious
162. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Detention, Character Evidence, and the New Crimi-
nal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 741 (2010) (observing that California Legislature
was aware of Oyler at the time it enacted its Three Strikes law).
163. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
164. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456; Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364–65.
165. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28–29 (2003).
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and/or violent prior felonies, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the
[three-strike’] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.”170 Unlike the
other types of judicially-exercised prosecutorial discretion, such as
the power to dismiss under de minimis statutes or the power to re-
view death sentences for proportionality, the California legislature
did not expressly grant judges the power to discount one of the
strikes leading to a stringent mandatory minimum penalty. Instead,
the California Supreme Court inferred that it had such power from
another, de minimis type statute that allowed a court to dismiss a
criminal action “in the furtherance of justice” on its own motion.171
The California court reasoned that if a court had the power to dismiss
a case, it had the “lesser power” to not consider a previous conviction
for the purpose of sentencing.172
Trial court opinions provide the best source for informing the ap-
propriate use of prosecutorial discretion. While there has been criti-
cism of the California courts for frequently allowing all prior and
current convictions to count toward the three strikes required to trig-
ger draconian mandatory minimums, trial courts have certainly exer-
cised their discretion to strike priors more readily than they have
dismissed cases under de minimis statutes. Appellate courts in Cali-
fornia have concluded that trial courts have abused their discretion
by not counting prior strikes, thus eliminating the mandatory mini-
mum penalties.173 Interestingly, the appellate courts have yet to con-
clude that a trial court abused its discretion in finding that all three
strikes appropriately applied to a defendant.174
Even though the power to not consider one or more of a defen-
dant’s priors derives from a trial court’s power to dismiss a case in
the interests of justice, California courts do not base this decision on
whether the prosecution leading to the strike should have been
thwarted. Instead, the California Supreme Court in Williams in-
structed lower courts that they were not to consider one or more of
the strikes if the defendant’s “character, background, and prospects”
place him “outside the spirit of the three strike law.”175
170. Id. at 17.
171. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 629–30 (Cal. 1996) (quoting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385).
172. Id.
173. But see People v. Garcia, 976 P.2d 831, 835 (Cal. 1999).
174. Romano, supra note 159, at 171.
175. People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998).
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While California is the most well-known of the states to have
three-strikes legislation, many states gives courts this kind of discre-
tion. Twenty-three states have two-, three-, or four-strike provisions,
more commonly known as habitual offender laws.176 Just as in Cali-
fornia, these states proscribe sentencing based not only on the seri-
ousness of the charged offense but also on an offender’s criminal
history. Like California, courts in these states have taken on a degree
of discretion regarding how these statutes should be applied. For ex-
ample, in Florida and Connecticut, courts will not impose a sentence
enhancement for a third strike if it does not serve the public inter-
est.177 In Louisiana, the courts will not apply the three strikes provi-
sion if it would violate the constitutional protection against excessive
punishment.178
This standard resembles the traditional exercise of prosecutorial
power. The court evaluates whether the circumstances of the offense
warrant a non-felony charge, or something is so redemptive about the
defendant that the prosecution should not have sought the enhanced
punishment for the second or third strike. Professor Michael Ro-
mano, commenting on the three-strikes sentencing scheme, has ob-
served “the startling breadth of discretion it bestows on trial
judges.”179 “Standards for wielding this discretion,” he noted, “are as-
tonishingly vague.”180 Precisely because of this lack of standards, the
trial court’s discretion in three-strike laws is like the type of discre-
tion wielded by prosecutors.
Predictably, such vague standards produce inconsistent results.
In State v. Alvarez, the trial court did not consider the defendant’s
four prior convictions for residential burglary when sentencing him
for possession of less than one-half a gram of methamphetamine.181
The trial court’s rationale largely turned on the inappropriateness of
a twenty-five year sentence for this crime.182 Absent the three-strikes
law, the trial judge was able to sentence the defendant to one year in
prison followed by three years unsupervised probation.183
However, the trial court in Foroutan did not dismiss any of the
defendant’s prior strikes in a very similar case. Ali Foroutan had
176. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 463 (1997) (see appendix A).
177. Id. at 463–80.
178. Id. at 468.
179. Romano, supra note 159, at 171.
180. Id.
181. People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), 928 P.2d 1171, 1177–78 (Cal. 1997).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1174.
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committed three non-violent residential burglaries and was arrested
in a motel room on suspicion of having just burglarized his friend. He
was found in possession of 0.03 grams of methamphetamine. The jury
convicted Foroutan on the possession charge but not the burglary
charge. Refusing to dismiss the defendant’s prior strikes, or regard
his current crime as a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes, the
judge sentenced Ali Foroutan to life.184
California trial courts, which have the final say on whether the
enhanced penalties under the three-strikes law ought to apply, have
looked to a variety of considerations including: (1) the defendants de-
gree of involvement in the current and previous crimes;185 (2) the na-
ture of the current and previous offenses;186 (3) whether priors
suggest isolated episodes or a pattern of recidivism;187 (4) in drug
cases, the amount of drugs involved;188 (5) the defendant’s perform-
ance on parole;189 and (6) contrition.190 These sorts of considerations
are, of course, relevant to how defendants should be charged for all
sorts of crimes. Thus, in deciding whether a crime should be consid-
ered a strike, judges provide guidance on the equitable issues in-
volved in the challenged offense. Prosecutors should consider this
184. Understandably, Professor Romano decries the inconsistency of these results.
From a larger perspective, however, the situation could be far worse (though we don’t
deny the comparative injustice done to Ali Foroutan). The interpretive gloss Califor-
nia courts have placed on the three-strikes law obviously gives judges the power to
second-guess the decision of prosecutors seeking very serious mandatory minimums.
These decisions are publicly announced, as are their reasons. The inconsistent results
in Alvarez and Foroutan have no doubt prompted a public conversation about which
result was correct. This public discourse itself creates a standard of legitimacy for
prosecutors on how to handle future cases involving small amounts of drugs. Under a
scheme where judges lack discretion, as was the case in Oyler v. Boles, the prosecutor
was not required to provide any reasoning for the decision to request a mandatory life
sentence. Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight Dis-
proportionate Sentences Under California’s Three Strikes Laws, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 311, 344–45 (2010).
185. People v. Rivers, No. H024161, 2003 WL 1685754, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
28, 2003) (embezzlement of $3500 was minor relative to typical embezzlement cases).
The Tennessee Supreme Court considered a similar argument in reviewing a denial of
pretrial diversion. State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1999).
186. People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429, 433–34 (Cal. 1998).
187. People v. Garcia, 976 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1999).
188. People v. Crabb, No. F037855, 2002 WL 31013805, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
9, 2002) (trial court observed that a small amount of drugs, especially when for per-
sonal consumption, should not be consider as a strike).
189. People v. Anzaldua, No. H022568, 2002 WL 1723989, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July
25, 2002) (observing that defendant was married and had done well on parole).
190. People v. Webster, 2004 WL 1354258 at *3 (Cal. App. June 17, 2004) (observ-
ing that other trial judges could find defendant’s contrition sufficient to strike felony).
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guidance when charging defendants and in plea bargaining
negotiations.
More recently, California courts have provided guidance to prose-
cutors in interpreting the three-strikes law in another way. The Cali-
fornia high court softened the three-strikes law by clarifying that
each “strike” must occur as part of a different offense.191 In a case
where a woman had been charged with two felonies — carjacking and
robbery — for the same offense of stealing a car, the court found that
she could only be charged with a single “strike.”192 As the court ex-
plained, “[t]he public . . . would have understood that no one can be
called for two strikes on just one swing.”193 This opinion provides one
possible view of how prosecutors ought to charge. At a general level,
prosecutors should not charge two crimes that allege the same facts
even if double jeopardy does not prohibit both charges. As a specific
application to this rule, this decision strongly suggests that prosecu-
tors should not charge both robbery and carjacking. Rather than im-
posing such a limitation via the inflexible and heavy-handed double
jeopardy clause, this decision offers an advisory opinion on the appro-
priateness of such charges.
Three-strikes laws thus vest courts with this sort of discretion
invite courts to use the same sort of reasoning prosecutors use in de-
ciding how to charge, providing a basis for courts to comment on the
appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion — and an opportunity for
negotiators to point to a neutral authority on charging decisions.
C. Review of Denials of Pretrial Diversion
When judges exercise prosecutorial-like discretion, they gener-
ally do so to limit the power of prosecutors. In the handful of jurisdic-
tions that permit judicial review of prosecutorial denials of pre-trial
diversion, courts are not looking so much at the substance of these
decisions as much as the process.194 Pretrial diversion is a procedure
191. Sharon Bernstein, California High Court Softens ‘Three Strikes’ Law,




194. A few states have expressly recognized the power of courts to review at least
some aspect of a prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion. See Flynt v. Commonwealth,
105 S.W.3d 415 (Ky. 2003); State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1996); Common-
wealth v. Stranger, 575 A.2d 930 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The bulk of the cases on this
issue, however, have come from two states, New Jersey and Tennessee. See Debra T.
Landis, Annotation, Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or Dismissal of
Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s Consent to Non-Criminal Alternative, 4
A.L.R.4th 147 (1981).
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by which a defendant is placed on a period of probation, after which
the charges against him are dismissed and his record expunged.195
These courts ensure that prosecutors have considered all the appro-
priate factors, and, to a lesser extent, gave these factors due weight
before rejecting a requested diversion. Courts in these jurisdictions
require prosecutors to consider these factors in writing. Prosecutors
are thus required by courts to establish their own criteria for how
their discretion ought to be exercised.
New Jersey, for instance, explains that its diversion program is
designed to provide an alternative to traditional prosecution in “vic-
timless” crimes, where the defendant would be harmed by the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions, and the alternative to traditional
punishment would not undermine deterrence of the crime.196 Even
though prosecutors generally have an absolute right to bring, or not
bring, a case supported by probable cause,197 courts have accepted
legislative invitations to supervise the manner in which prosecutors
choose to exercise their discretion to deny requests for pretrial
diversion.
Courts reviewing a prosecutor’s decision to deny a defendant pre-
trial diversion ensure that prosecutors have examined a variety of
factors in arriving at this decision and, to a lesser extent, ensure that
the prosecutor’s conclusions based on these factors are not unreason-
able. The primary result of this particular type of judicial oversight
has been to compel prosecutors to act more like judges. To provide a
sufficient record for review, courts require prosecutors to put their
decisions into writing. When prosecutors draft these decisions, they
record their reasoning in writing, much as judges do.198 Judicial over-
sight in this context therefore forces prosecutors to define the stan-
dards of legitimacy that judges define in other contexts when they
exercise prosecutorial-type discretion.
Unlike when they apply de minimis statutes, courts generally do
not conclude that a prosecutor reached the incorrect decision when
they reject the decisions of prosecutors to deny pretrial diversion.
195. See Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L. J. 827, 827
(1974).
196. N.J.S.A. 2C: 43–12 (2014).
197. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in
the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1259, 1261, 270 (2011) (describing ABA
ethics standard).
198. An applicant who is denied diversion is entitled to an adequate written expla-
nation by the prosecutor for the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to diversion. See, e.g.,
Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 520 P.2d 412 (Court 1974); State v.
Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321 (Court 1976).
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Courts rarely second guess the substantive determinations of prose-
cutors when they review their decisions to deny diversion. They do,
however, review how prosecutors arrived at their decision, and they
review the considerations used by prosecutors.
The basis for judicial oversight of a prosecutor’s decisions on pre-
trial diversion rests upon the notion that prosecutors are in essence
engaging in a type of sentencing when granting diversions.199 The
defendant’s probationary period occurs under judicial supervision
and operates essentially as a suspended sentence — if the defendant
violates the terms of the diversionary program, a conviction will be
entered and the defendant punished under it.200 Of course, absent a
statute of limitations, a prosecutor could achieve the same result by
dismissing a case with the threat that the case would be reinitiated if
the defendant failed to maintain a certain standard of conduct. The
court’s involvement in the decision process does not compel judicial
oversight of a prosecutor’s diversion.
Legislatures have not been clear in assigning courts the task of
overseeing the work of prosecutors in this context.201 Nevertheless,
courts have used largely vague statutory authority to require prose-
cutors to explain the reasons for denying diversions. In some cases,
courts have required prosecutors to show that they have considered
all the factors supporting an application for diversion. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court has explained:
The decision to divert an offender from prosecution is analogous
to the prosecutor’s charging function and involves the implicit exer-
cise of judicial power; therefore, judicial review is permitted.202
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that written reasons
for denials (1) facilitate judicial review; (2) assist in evaluating the
success of the diversion program; and (3) dispel suspicions of arbi-
trariness.203 Of course, all of these benefits would equally apply to a
prosecutor’s explanation of why he or she elected to bring a particular
set of charges, or declined charges. However, courts have only chosen
to require such an explanation when prosecutors are denying pretrial
diversion.
199. See Note, supra note 195, at 843 (describing pretrial diversion as “sentencing
activity by nonjudicial personnel”).
200. See Vincent P. Wyatt, Crime and Punishment . . . and Punishment, 46 TENN.
BAR J. 12, 12 n.2 (2010) (“Under judicial diversion, a conviction is not entered and is
never entered if the individual successfully completes the probationary supervision.”).
201. See State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153, 162 (Tenn. 1999) (Holder, J., dissenting).
202. State v. Caliguiri, 726 A.2d 912, 917 (N.J. 1999).
203. See State v. Nwobu, 652 A.2d 1209, 1215 (N.J. 1995).
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Prosecutors consider criteria derived both from factors described
by legislatures and those developed by courts considering appeals
from denials by prosecutors. The New Jersey statute demonstrates
the difficulty of specifically identifying how prosecutors ought to exer-
cise discretion. The multiple factors offered in the statute resemble
multi-factor constitutional law standards but have little predictive
value. Nevertheless, the statute provides a process; the decision-
maker must take into account a list of factors too long and vague to
provide any meaningful guidance:204
(1) The nature of the offense;
(2) The facts of the case;
(3) The motivation and age of the defendant;
(4) The desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution;
(5) The existence of personal problems and character traits
which may be related to the applicant’s crime and for which ser-
vices are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or
which may be provided more effectively through supervisory
treatment and the probability that the causes of criminal behav-
ior can be controlled by proper treatment;
(6) The likelihood that the applicant’s crime is related to a con-
dition or situation that would be conducive to change through
his participation in supervisory treatment;
(7) The needs and interests of the victim and society;
(8) The extent to which the applicant’s crime constitutes part of
a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior;
(9) The applicant’s record of criminal and penal violations and
the extent to which he may present a substantial danger to
others;
(10) Whether or not the crime is of an assaultive or violent na-
ture, whether in the criminal act itself or in the possible injuri-
ous consequences of such behavior;
(11) Consideration of whether or not prosecution would exacer-
bate the social problem that led to the applicant’s criminal act;
(12) The history of the use of physical violence toward others;
(13) Any involvement of the applicant with organized crime;
(14) Whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value
of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public
need for prosecution;
204. As Josh Bowers has observed, prosecutors consider exactly these sorts of fac-
tors in their charging and bargaining decisions. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Norma-
tive Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655,
1706–07 (2010) (“Prosecutors base discretionary bargaining decisions on prior record,
employment, familial and educational status and history; the defendant’s character;
and his perceived motives for his criminal acts.”).
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(15) Whether or not the applicant’s involvement with other peo-
ple in the crime charged or in other crime is such that the inter-
est of the State would be best served by processing his case
through traditional criminal justice system procedures;
(16) Whether or not the applicant’s participation in pretrial in-
tervention will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants;
and
(17) Whether or not the harm done to society by abandoning
criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society
from channeling an offender into a supervisory treatment
program.205
In Tennessee, by contrast, judges alone have developed the crite-
ria that prosecutors must consider. The Tennessee Legislature pro-
vided defendants the right to appeal a prosecutor’s denial of diversion
to the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard.206 The stat-
ute did not, however, describe the criteria by which prosecutors were
to consider requests for pretrial diversion. Instead, Tennessee courts
established their own criteria to evaluate whether prosecutors had
abused their discretion. Under the common law created by these
courts, prosecutors must consider “the defendant’s criminal record,
social history, the physical and mental condition of the defendant
where appropriate, and the best interest of both the public and the
defendant.”207
Similarly, in other states, courts have used a variety of criteria to
recommend pretrial diversion over the prosecutor’s objection. In Con-
necticut, courts have considered the lack of prior offenses, opportuni-
ties for the defendant, and rehabilitation potential in granting
pretrial diversion.208 In Pennsylvania, prosecutors were instructed
not to consider prior expunged criminal convictions when the denial
of pretrial diversion was based solely on defendant’s failure to ac-
knowledge these convictions, and where a statute rendered such mat-
ters confidential.209 The decision-making process of prosecutors in
cases involving pretrial diversion — or similarly named devices for
avoiding prosecution — are unique in that they are disclosed to the
court and the defendant permitting judicial assessment of the deci-
sion and use of such decisions as persuasive authority by subsequent
defendants in negotiating with prosecutors.
205. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C: 43-12(e).
206. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(b)(3) (2014).
207. State v. Hammersly, 650 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983).
208. State v. Tucker, 595 A.2d. 832 (Conn. 1991).
209. Commonwealth v. Benn, 675 A.2d 261, 263 (Pa. 1996).
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In all of these cases, the defendant is granted a written descrip-
tion of the reasons for or against pretrial diversion. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court explained, a prosecutor denying a request for
diversion is not permitted to simply “parrot” the language of the rele-
vant statutes, but must explain why the facts of the defendant’s case
justify the result.210 Requiring this written explanation is important
as it gives courts reasoning for review. Courts review these decisions
for abuse of discretion and may reverse if the prosecutor failed to con-
sider all relevant factors, or weighed the factors in such an unreason-
able manner as to constitute a “patent and gross abuse of
discretion.”211
Defense lawyers thus have two sources of legitimacy in judicial
oversight of pretrial diversion decisions. First, the written decisions
of prosecutors approving or rejecting diversion provide a unique pub-
lic record of prosecutorial reasoning. Second, judicial opinions review-
ing these decisions add another layer of analysis, affirming,
reversing, or criticizing the reasoning.
Even in decisions where a prosecutor denies diversion, that pros-
ecutor may find some factors that weigh in favor of the defendants.
Even if a subsequent defendant does not seek pretrial diversion, the
written decision provides a standard of legitimacy to use in a negotia-
tion with that prosecutor or another when the same mitigating fac-
tors are at issue. To the extent judicial opinions find the conclusions
of prosecutors unreasonable, which occurs much less often, the judi-
cial decisions provide another source of appropriate criteria for prose-
cutors to consider in deciding whether leniency ought to be granted.
D. Proportionality Review in Capital Cases
In rare situations, appellate courts find that death sentences are
disproportionate to the crime charged. These decisions provide in-
sight for prosecutors on whether a death sentence is appropriate in
subsequent cases with similar facts. By engaging in a more thorough
analysis of proportionality review, judges have an opportunity to con-
tribute more meaningfully to the plea and charging decisions in capi-
tal cases.
Many state legislatures in the 1970s began requiring appellate
courts to consider whether a death sentence was disproportionate,
even though a jury had correctly found that the aggravating factors
210. State v. Caliguiri, 726 A.2d 912, 916 (N.J. 1999); State v. Sutton, 402 A.2d.
230 (N.J. 1979).
211. Caliguiri, 726 A.2d at 917.
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supporting capital punishment outweighed the mitigating factors.212
These legislatures were responding to the Supreme Court’s invalida-
tion of the existing system of capital punishment under which juries,
with virtually no guidance, determined whether death-eligible de-
fendants lived or died.213 In Furman v. Georgia, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment because of the arbitrariness of its application.214 The
Court did not suggest a mechanism for states to use to constitution-
ally determine who was susceptible to the ultimate punishment, but
merely concluded that the system then in place, which left juries vir-
tually limitless discretion in choosing between death and some term
of years, produced results that could not be reasonably reconciled.215
Following Furman, states attempted to draft statutes that would
permit them to retain capital punishment. Most states sought to
guide jurors’ discretion and include a mechanism to correct for aber-
rational juries following the decision. Most states that retained the
death penalty after Furman required appellate courts to review all
death sentences to ensure they were not disproportionate to other
such sentences. Under the post-Furman schemes developed in virtu-
ally all states, once a defendant was found guilty of a form of murder
that made him eligible for the death penalty,216 juries were to deter-
mine whether any aggravating circumstances existed that justified
the imposition of the penalty.217 Against any aggravating circum-
stances, jurors in these jurisdictions were to weigh any mitigating
212. See Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capi-
tal Cases (With Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1168, n.29 (2001).
213. Steven M. Sprenger, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Propor-
tionality Review in Capital Cases, 73 IOWA L. REV. 719, 726–28 (1988) (describing
proportionality review as a response to Supreme Court’s invalidation of death pen-
alty); Leigh B. Bienan, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High
Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice,” 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
130, 135 (1996) (same).
214. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
215. See id.
216. Following Furman, two states, Georgia and Louisiana, retained the possibil-
ity of the death penalty for rape. The Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592–60 (1977) concluded that the death penalty for rape of an adult was dispro-
portionate to the offense. More recently, the Supreme Court has concluded that a Lou-
isiana statute that provided the death penalty for rape of a child violated the Eighth
Amendment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008). For a criticism of the
conclusions drawn in the opinion, see Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engag-
ing Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355, 362 (2008), and for a view
supporting the Court’s conclusions, see Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage,
and the Death Penalty, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 17 (2008).
217. Aggravating circumstances ranged from very clear factors, such as the exis-
tence of a prior felony that may have little relevance to whether a defendant should be
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circumstances suggesting that the death penalty ought not be im-
posed. Proportionality review was an additional requirement: appel-
late courts were asked to determine whether the death sentence was
appropriate even though aggravating factors had been found to out-
weigh the mitigating factors.
Proportionality review in the capital context provides a rare mo-
ment of judicial oversight of the decision-making typically performed
by prosecutors. Capital and non-capital cases involve an extraordi-
nary amount of discretion in charging, plea bargaining, and the delib-
erations of the jury. When defendant’s counsel Anthony Amsterdam
contended in argument against one of the post-Furman efforts to re-
instate the death penalty that too much discretion was left in the sys-
tem to determine who lives and who dies, Justice Stewart observed,
“Mr. Amsterdam . . . [d]oesn’t your argument prove too much? Our
entire system of justice is rife with discretion, nullification, grace,
and capriciousness. Is it all unconstitutional?”218
Indeed, every criminal case involves the type of discretion Am-
sterdam found objectionable, but Georgia and a number of other ju-
risdictions created a mechanism to help ensure that the discretion
inherent in the system did not produce inconsistent results. The leg-
islature instructed the Supreme Court of Georgia by statute, just as
the high courts of many states were instructed, to examine the facts
of capital convictions to determine whether the death sentence was
disproportionate to the defendant’s crime and criminal history. In
other words, the legislature subjected appropriateness of a death sen-
tence, a question not readily reducible to a legal standard, to judicial
assessment.219
given a life or death sentence, see, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (2014), to
factors that seem to capture, at least in principle, the justifications for a death sen-
tence, but are quite vague and difficult to consistently apply. Defendants in Florida,
for example, are eligible for execution if their homicidal acts were “heinous, atrocious,
or cruel,” see Richard A. Rosen, The “Especially Heinous” Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Cases — The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986) or in
Virginia if their crimes constituted demonstrated “a degree of moral turpitude and
psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal mal-
ice and premeditation.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978); see
also Melissa A. Ray, “Meaningful Guidance:” Reforming Virginia’s Model Jury In-
structions on Vileness and Future Dangerousness, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 85, 91–92 (2000).
218. See Romano, supra note 184, at 312 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at
21, Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (No. 75-5394), Roberts, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (No. 75-
5844).
219. Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital
Cases (With Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1209 (2001) (describing
proportionality review as “implicitly second-guessing the state’s prosecutors.”).
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Judicial consideration of the proportionality of death sentences
should therefore provide at least a starting point for discussing how
factors beyond the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors
should be considered in making capital charging and plea bargaining
decisions. It has frequently been observed that state courts have
rarely been vigorous in their role of reviewing the proportionality of
death sentences.220 As one appellate court judge observed, the pro-
cess of proportionality review in his state “does not . . . demonstrate
that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases.”221
There is extraordinary intuitive appeal in the idea that similar
cases, especially capital cases, should be treated similarly. Professor
Penny White’s review of the case law illustrates the stark inconsis-
tencies in the application of the death penalty in the same jurisdic-
tion, or even the same case.222 Professor White offered an example
from Alabama, where two low-functioning defendants were in a con-
spiracy to kill. One of the men had an IQ between 58 and 70, and the
other with an IQ of 68, conspired to kill one of their wives. The defen-
dant who contracted for his wife’s killing received life while the trig-
german received death. By contrast, she offers a case from Georgia
where two men, Smith and Hall, robbed a liquor store. Smith began
firing as he entered, prompting the clerk to return fire and shoot
Hall. Smith continued to shoot until the clerk died. Smith received a
life sentence, Hall a death sentence.223
Individual and unique cases with nearly identical facts but dif-
ferent results may present easy answers, but the role of appellate
courts in conducting proportionality review is considerably more diffi-
cult outside this limited context. If triggermen in murder-for-hire
cases often receive death sentences, or (less likely) if accomplices in
fatal robberies frequently are condemned to die, then it is unclear
whether a death sentence is disproportionate even in the cases cited
by Professor White. The life sentences could simply be aberrational
examples of jury mercy, the very sort of occurrence Justice Stewart
observed to be a ubiquitous characteristic of the entire criminal jus-
tice system.
220. See Donald H. Wallace & Jonathon R. Sorensen, Missouri Proportionality Re-
view: An Assessment of a State Supreme Court’s Procedures in Capital Cases, 8 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 285, 311 (1994).
221. See State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96, 107 (Mo. 1983) (Seiler, J., dissenting in
part).
222. Penny White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After
Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 813, 813–14 (1999).
223. Id. at 813.
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Understandably, courts have been unable to develop a mecha-
nism to compare cases. One state supreme court has attempted to
define particular circumstances of capital murders and determine the
frequency with which death sentences are returned for murders in
that category, viewing with greatest scrutiny those types of cases in
which death sentences are most rare.224 Still, most state appellate
courts appear to inquire only whether other juries have sentenced
defendants to die for crimes involving similar levels of culpability.225
Using this method, appellate courts find death sentences proportion-
ate to the crime in an overwhelming percentage of cases.226
When courts labor with these decisions, if they do so conscien-
tiously, they offer guidance for prosecutors considering how to exer-
cise discretion in the most serious of cases. Especially when courts
find death sentences disproportionate, they tend to provide substan-
tial reasoning because they are acting contrary to the will of the
(often) elected prosecutor and the jury in a very high profile manner.
The lack of meaningful standards for judges in making these de-
cisions renders their jobs difficult, but as illustrated throughout this
Article, judges in other contexts are often entrusted with similar
judgment calls that cannot be reduced to legal standards. As in these
other contexts, judges are reluctant to use this power. It is precisely
when they act in this role, however, that they offer guidance to prose-
cutors who routinely exercise this sort of judgment. When they con-
clude that a sentence of death is disproportionate because there was
224. See Judge David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New
Jersey Experience, 41 CRIM. L. BULL., Art. 6, Issue 2 (Spring 2005). But see Barry
Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (With
Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2001) (contending that “com-
parative proportionality review is constitutionally unwarranted, methodologically un-
sound, and theoretically incoherent”).
225. William W. Berry, III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687, 707
(2012) (criticizing this “precedent-seeking” approach as providing “no useful barome-
ters to evaluate the relative proportionality of a given case”).
226. See, e.g., Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality
Review, and Claims of Fairness (With Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L.
REV. 775, 836 (2004) (observing that there were no reversals in Washington on the
basis of proportionality from 1981 to 2003).
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insufficient evidence of substantial deliberation,227 was not the trig-
german,228 had no substantial criminal history,229 acted under
mental or emotional anguish,230 demonstrated potential for rehabili-
tation,231 played a limited role in the crimes leading to the death,232
had a history of drug or alcohol abuse,233 had low intelligence,234 suf-
fered brain damage or mental illness,235 experienced a particularly
bad childhood,236 was young at the time of the offense,237 cooperated
with the police,238 or showed particular remorse,239 they suggest
227. State v. Watson, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (Ariz. 1981) (robbery gone bad); Caruthers
v. State, 465 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1985) (same); Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965
(Fla. 1996); Deangelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993) (ongoing quarrel that
escalated); McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 1991); State v. Sonnier, 380 So.
2d 1, 8 (La. 1979); Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792, 795 (Miss. 1989); Biondi v. State,
699 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1985); Harvey v. State, 682 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Nev. 1984)
(robbery gone bad).
228. Sumlin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ark. 1981); Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d
1234, 1237 (Fla. 1996); Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833, 839 (Ga. 1978); State v. Wind-
sor, 716 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Idaho 1985); State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152, 1159 (Idaho
1985); Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792, 794 (Miss. 1989).
229. Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1994); Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396
(Fla. 1988); Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103
(Fla. 1981); State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800 (Idaho 1993); State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d
1182, 1194 (Idaho 1985); People v. Glecker, 411 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1980); State v. Son-
nier, 380 So. 2d 1, 8 (La. 1979); State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982).
230. Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1993) (jealously regarding relationship); Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla.
1990) (defendant thought victim was romantically involved with another man);
Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990) (ongoing domestic dispute grew increas-
ingly heated).
231. Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059
(Fla. 1990); State v. Watson, 628 P.2d 943, 946–78 (Ariz. 1981); State v. Windsor, 716
P.2d 1182, 1194 (Idaho 1985).
232. People v. Glecker, 411 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1980); State v. Sonnier, 380 So. 2d 1, 8
(La. 1979).
233. Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990); People v. Glecker, 411 N.E.2d
849 (Ill. 1980); State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982).
234. Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1995); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80, 85 (Fla. 1991).
235. Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1994); Deangelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440,
443 (Fla. 1993); Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792, 794 (Miss. 1989); Haynes v. State,
739 P.2d 497 (Nev. 1987); Biondi v. State, 699 P.2d 1062 (Nev. 1985).
236. Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138
(Fla. 1995); Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995).
237. Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234
(Fla. 1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1994); State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d
1152 (Idaho 1985); Harvey v. State, 682 P.2d 1384 (Nev. 1984).
238. Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1995); State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d
333 (Mo. 1982).
239. Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990).
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prosecutors ought to view these factors favorably in deciding
whether, and how much leniency is appropriate in charging and plea
bargaining decisions.
E. Rejection of Guilty Pleas
In each of the other examples so far considered, judges exercise
prosecutorial-type discretion to impose upper boundaries on prosecu-
tors. When judges review guilty pleas, however, they exercise
prosecutorial-type discretion to set lower boundaries.240 This exercise
of judicial authority provides prosecutors an opportunity to explain
the legitimacy of their offers. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11 and its state analogues, trial courts have discretion to reject
plea bargains. Similar to the broad language used to define the judi-
cial role in setting upper boundaries, Rule 11 “provides that a trial
court ‘may refuse to accept a guilty plea,’ [but] it fails to delineate the
circumstances under which it may do so.”241 The leading case on the
power of the trial judge to reject a plea, United States v. Ammidown,
recognized that a plea to a lesser charge may be rejected only if the
offer of a reduced charge was not “related to a prosecutorial pur-
pose.”242 The court explained that these purposes include “an insuffi-
ciency of evidence, a doubt as to the admissibility of certain evidence
under the exclusionary rules, a need for evidence to bring another
felon to justice, or other similar considerations.”
In Ammidown, the D.C. Circuit held that if the reduction of the
sentence in a proposed plea bargain is based on one of these purposes,
then the reduction does not intrude on judicial sentencing discretion.
When prosecutorial discretion to reduce is not, however, based on one
of those utilitarian prosecutorial factors, judges are permitted in “ex-
treme cases” to reject a prosecutor’s leniency on the basis of the
judges’ own views of the equities.243 Judges and prosecutors both
have the ability to determine the sentence in a criminal case based on
their individual views of the circumstances. The prosecutor frames
the range of sentencing options through the charging decision and
any recommendations made in the course of sentencing. In issuing
240. As one commentator observed, “separation of powers questions arise from ju-
dicial rejection of a negotiated plea.” Lowell B. Miller, Judicial Discretion to Reject
Negotiated Pleas, 63 GEO. L.J. 241, 251 (1974). Of course this is true, but as illus-
trated throughout this Article, there are a host of exceptions to the separation of pow-
ers concerns that are traditionally viewed as limiting a judge’s ability to second-guess
prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining decisions.
241. United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
242. Id. at 623.
243. Id.
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the sentence, a judge determines how the facts of the particular case
should map onto the range of punishment provided for a particular
crime. Prosecutors and judges each consider the equities of a particu-
lar case and, according to Ammidown, when those considerations
form the basis for a guilty plea, a trial court may reject that plea in
extreme cases.
Courts under Federal Rule of Evidence 48(a) play a similar role
in supervising the prosecution’s dismissal of criminal charges.244 As
with all of these exercises of prosecutorial-like discretion by judges,
disagreement among judges is inevitable, but their reasoning
grounds the conversations that occur during negotiations between
prosecutors and defense counsel. In United States v. Armstrong, for
instance, a United States District Court in Massachusetts found a
plea bargain inappropriate in a situation in which a charge was dis-
missed to avoid immigration consequences.245 Justice Stevens’ major-
ity opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky contains a contrary view — that a
defense lawyer who was aware of the immigration consequences of a
conviction would be in a position to negotiate with the prosecutor for
an offense that would not trigger deportation.246 Obviously implicit
in Stevens’ opinion is the premise that prosecutors may appropriately
consider the possibility of deportation in deciding how to charge and
plea bargain.
The judicial role in rejecting plea bargains, as well as dismissals,
however, is narrower than the equitable factors considered by prose-
cutors. While Ammidown and its progeny permit a judge, in extreme
cases, to exercise his or her discretion, a judge cannot engage in the
quid pro quo exchanges that prosecutors make during plea bargain-
ing to ensure cooperation, certainty of conviction, or presumably even
conservation of resources. These factors are uniquely in the ken of
prosecutors — prosecutors are best able to assess the need to obtain
evidence against other suspects, the weaknesses in their own case,
and the pressing need to allocate resources to other cases.
Prosecutors in the Ammidown case appeared to have been driven
to offer leniency solely on the basis of cooperation, not on their view
that leniency was equitably justified. The defendant was charged
with the first degree murder of his wife and the conspiracy to commit
244. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 48(a) was enacted “to protect a defen-
dant against prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging,
when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objec-
tion.” Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977).
245. United States v. Armstrong, 652 F. Supp.2d 136 (D. Mass. 2009).
246. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
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that murder. According to his confession, he had arranged to have
her murdered in the parking lot of a department store so that he
could inherit her considerable fortune and open a night club.247 He
changed his mind because he did not want his young son to see his
mother murdered.248 He therefore arranged with his partner in
crime, Richard Anthony Lee, to have his wife kidnapped and to use
the ransom money to start the club.
As planned, Mr. Ammidown took his wife to dinner some time
later and at a prearranged location, Lee jumped in the car, abducted
Mrs. Ammidown and raped her to “impress Mrs. Ammidown ‘with the
seriousness of the threat.’”249 Though Mr. Ammidown claimed in his
confession this was not part of the plan, Lee also killed Mrs.
Ammidown.250
In exchange for a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, Mr.
Ammidown agreed to testify against Lee.251 Without Mr. Am-
midown’s testimony, the prosecution was afraid that it would be una-
ble to obtain a conviction against Lee.252 In exchange, the
government offered Mr. Ammidown a plea to second-degree murder
and recommended nothing less than a life sentence, without the pos-
sibility of parole for fifteen years. Given Mr. Ammidown’s age, he
would not have been eligible for parole until he was sixty-four.253
This is precisely the type of decision-making that we, as a society,
have entrusted to prosecutors. There is little argument that mitigat-
ing circumstances of the crime, or something redeeming in Am-
midown’s life called for an indictment of crime less than first-degree
murder.
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Ammidown recognized that a court
could, in extreme cases, second-guess a prosecutor’s decision about
how a plea is justified by the equities of a case. It was not, however,
the equities of the Ammidown case that prompted this plea offer. The
plea was motivated by the prosecutor’s view that such a deal was nec-
essary to obtain another conviction — a rationale for plea bargaining
that the D.C. Circuit regarded to be beyond judicial oversight.
Courts have generally accepted the Ammidown rule that
prosecutorial decisions on the basis of excessive leniency are subject
247. United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
248. Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 617–18.
249. Id. at 618.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 622–23 (“we are scared to death that unless there is a successful
way to prosecute [Lee,] someone . . . will die . . . .”).
253. Id. at 618.
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to rejection by judges, but leniency driven by quid pro quo exchanges
to preserve resources, achieve cooperation, or ensure a conviction are
not.254 When leniency is offered for these reasons, prosecutors are
foregoing punishment they believe the defendant deserves to achieve
another worthy goal.
Courts have accepted Ammidown’s invitation to set lower-bound-
aries on prosecutorial leniency. Courts have rejected pleas that were
considered too lenient.255 But the fear Ammidown addresses — that
prosecutors offer too much leniency based on equitable considera-
tions — seems backwards.
The institutional role of prosecutors may well cause them to
under-value equitable considerations calling for mercy. Prosecutors
work with the victims of the crime and the detectives who built the
cases against the defendants — their perspective is necessarily tilted
from this viewpoint. This same institutional role, however, may cause
prosecutors to over-reward cooperation and conservation of re-
sources. Ammidown does, however, meaningfully contribute to the
creation of standards of legitimacy. The existence of this power legiti-
mates judicial entry into the prosecutorial sphere. Judges are given
the opportunity to not only prevent excesses by over-zealous prosecu-
tors, but also to rein in leniency by overly merciful prosecutors. Am-
midown, along with other opportunities for judicial contributions to
standards of legitimacy, fashions a system in which judges contrib-
ute, through upward and downward checks, to a set of standards for
viewing equities in criminal cases.
F. Sentencing in Cases that Could Have Been Charged as
Mandatory Minimums
In some sense, all sentencing decisions reflect judicial judgments
about prosecutorial charging decisions. An unusually light sentence
for a fairly serious charge can be read as a criticism of seeking a
charge that serious. Crimes implicating mandatory minimums, how-
ever, provide an easier basis of comparison between charging deci-
sions and the judge’s view of the case. Whether a judge exceeds the
254. See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 683–84 (2014); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 733, 774 (1980).
255. See People v. McCartney, 250 N.W.2d 135, 137–38 (Mich. App. 1976) (dic-
tum); State v. Belton, 226 A.2d 425, 429 (N.J. 1977) (dictum); People v. Portanova, 56
A.D.2d 265, 274–75 (N.Y. 1977) (dictum); Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 775 n.172
(citing United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977); Sarah N. Welling, Victim
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 318–32 (1987).
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sentence required for an uncharged mandatory minimum is as an
easy measure of the judge’s view of whether the mandatory minimum
could have appropriately been charged.
With mandatory minimums, judges do not have the discretion to
go below certain terms of years when certain facts are present. If a
prosecutor seeks a mandatory minimum sentence, and establishes
the requisite triggering facts, then a judge has no choice but to sen-
tence the defendant to a term greater than the minimum. In render-
ing these decisions, judges are providing guidance on how
prosecutors ought to exercise their discretion to seek the mandatory
minimum sentence.
Under some statutes, facts not required for a conviction can force
a judge to sentence a defendant above a certain prescribed number of
years. These facts include prior convictions, amount of drugs, and as
in Pennsylvania v. McMillan, possession of a weapon.256 In McMil-
lan, the trial judge ruled that Pennsylvania’s new mandatory mini-
mum law was unconstitutional and refused to sentence the defendant
to the five-year minimum.257
Mandatory minimums are something of a misnomer. Defendants
do not necessarily have to serve a minimum amount of time merely
because they have a certain number of convictions, or possessed a
firearm during the commission of a crime. Instead, mandatory mini-
mums transfer from the judge to the prosecutor the power to deter-
mine the lowest term of incarceration a defendant must serve. If a
prosecutor elects not to seek an enhancement for the third felony, or
the weapon possession, then the judge is free to consider a penalty
anywhere within the otherwise applicable range. Having found that
the defendant is a recidivist, or brandished a weapon, a judge may
well be inclined to sentence a defendant to a term greater than the
applicable mandatory minimum, but is not required to if the prosecu-
tor does not file notice that he is seeking an enhanced sentence on
this basis.258
256. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 530 (2001) (describing political popularity of three-strikes laws and
mandatory minimums for guns and drugs).
257. Pennsylvania v. McMillan, 477 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). The United States Su-
preme Court recently reversed the conclusion in McMillan that a jury was not re-
quired to find a factor justifying a mandatory minimum beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2153 (2013).
258. While a defendant is entitled to notice of a factor that will trigger a
mandatory minimum sentence, if the mandatory minimum sentence is within the
range of the judge’s discretion, the judge is obviously entitled to sentence the defen-
dant to that penalty.
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When prosecutors choose not to seek mandatory minimum pun-
ishments, the sentencing decisions of judges provides a source of gui-
dance in subsequent cases on whether it is appropriate to seek the
minimum sentence. The facts involved in the McMillan decision illus-
trate this point nicely. As Justice Stevens described in his dissent,
James Dennison, one of the three defendants in this consolidated
case, was a seventy-three-year-old man who shot a teenager from his
neighborhood that he suspected was stealing from his house.259
The trial judge in McMillan did not regard himself to be bound
by the mandatory five year minimum and gave the defendant, in
light of all the circumstances, an 111/2–23 months sentence.260 While
the trial court’s decision to disregard the minimum is unlikely to be
repeated, as such laws have been held to be constitutional, the case
provides a basis for arguing that a minimum sentence would be inap-
propriate in a similar case. In subsequent cases where a prosecutor
does not seek the mandatory minimum, a judge’s decision to sentence
above or below the uncharged minimum serves as a suggestion about
the appropriateness of the mandatory sentence.
In Philadelphia, a custom has developed among many trial court
judges when prosecutors seek mandatory minimums judges deem in-
appropriate. In bench trials, judges acquit defendants of the portion
of the crime requiring the minimum sentence, a throwback to the En-
glish practice known as pious perjury where judges would find a theft
to be less than the actual amount taken to avoid the death penalty.
When judges engage in such acts, these are also clear signals about
their view of the appropriateness of seeking a mandatory minimum.
As judges consider the unique circumstances of the cases in
which prosecutors could have sought a mandatory minimum sen-
tence, but chose not to, they provide guidance to prosecutors deciding
whether to seek such a sentencing enhancement. While the very
point of a mandatory minimum is to bypass a judge’s discretion to
consider a defendant’s individual circumstances, one hopes that pros-
ecutors will be sensitive to these circumstances.261
259. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion of-
fers a much less rich description of the facts of Dennison’s case, observing only that
“Petitioner Dennison seriously wounded an acquaintance.” 477 U.S. at 82. Reading
the majority’s opinion, one is clearly struck by the missing context. The other defend-
ants involved in this case all received much longer sentences.
260. McMillan, 477 U.S. at n.2.
261. Mandatory minimums do not become obsolete, or redundant, if prosecutors
are encouraged to follow the criteria judges consider in cases where prosecutors do not
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G. Upward and Downward Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Prior to Booker/Fan Fan
Judges exercise discretion in sentencing. However, this discre-
tion does not fit within the Article’s model of guidance because judges
always have the power to exercise this discretion.262 Because all ne-
gotiations operate in the shadow of predicted outcomes, prosecutors
will bargain in light of how a defendant is likely to be sentenced if
convicted.263 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, at least before they
were made advisory by the Supreme Court, substantially limited the
sentencing power of judges.264 The departures judges made during
that period had to be justified by extraordinary circumstances. These
departures were not part of the ordinary discretion of a judge sen-
tencing a defendant — the explanation had to satisfy an appellate
court that unusual circumstances justified the downward
departure.265
Departures were something of a hybrid between powers assigned
to judges to sentence and exercises of discretion resembling those typ-
ically available only to prosecutors. Prior to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, judges were given virtually unfettered discretion to de-
termine how to sentence offenders.266 Under the Guidelines, depar-
tures were permitted only for exceptional circumstances.267 When
judges departed from the Guidelines, they were concluding that the
facts fell outside the sentencing rubric that they had been provided.
But judges were still evaluating circumstances that they would have
traditionally considered in sentencing defendants. Thus, while judges
were dealing with facts not identified by legal standards, namely the
seek the minimum. Prosecutors who take into consideration the range of judicial opin-
ion on the individual circumstances of a case could reasonably seek a mandatory min-
imum sentence, consistent with the typical judicial view of the mitigating factors
involved, when facing a judge known to be particularly lenient.
262. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 9 (“From the beginning of the Republic,
federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”).
263. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 968–71 (describing negoti-
ations as always occurring in light of likely outcome).
264. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 82–84.
265. See Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion:
Koon’s Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guide-
lines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 526–49 (1999) (describing variances in federal circuits def-
erence to district courts downward departures prior to Booker).
266. Id. at 9.
267. See Michael S. Gelachak, Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, Departures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analy-
sis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 353 (1996) (observing that departures were reserved for
extraordinary cases by the Sentencing Commission but finding that departures were
“contrived” in a number of white-collar crime cases).
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Guidelines, these were exactly the sort of determinations that were
entrusted to judges prior to the Guidelines. This exercise of discre-
tion, even though made extraordinary by the Guidelines, was part of
the traditional judicial role.
Upward or downward departures under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines under § 3553, prior to Booker and Fan Fan, also have
characteristics of a judicial act of prosecutorial discretion and there-
fore may provide some additional bases for fashioning standards of
legitimacy. Prior to Booker and Fan Fan, the Guidelines created
hosts of mandatory minimum and maximum penalties. Decisions to
step outside these mandatory boundaries certainly resemble the deci-
sions of judges in California not to consider one of the felonies neces-
sary for a third-strike, or conclusions by appellate courts that the
death penalty is disproportionate. In each case, using criteria that
defy reduction to any sort of meaningful standard,268 a court is decid-
ing that a legislatively prescribed sentence is inappropriate. This is
the essence of prosecutorial discretion, and courts have frequently
concluded that they, unlike prosecutors, are unable to make decisions
ungoverned by clear standards.269
Though departures under § 3553 prior to Booker exemplify judi-
cially-exercised prosecutorial discretion and have occurred more
often than any of the other examples we offer, there are limits to the
information that can be gleaned from departures to fashion stan-
dards of legitimacy. Based on the Guidelines, a defendant’s socioeco-
nomic background, addiction to drugs, or financial distress could not
be considered as a basis for departure while a defendant’s family re-
sponsibilities could be considered only in extraordinary
circumstances.270
Upward departures were similarly limited to matters not consid-
ered by the Commission, but those aggravating factors considered by
the Commission provided for increases in sentences. A defendant’s
drug addiction, or rehabilitation, thus could not have been considered
in sentencing as these were common situations offered in mitigation
that the Commissioners ruled out-of-bounds in considering down-
ward departures.271 The anxiety produced by a protracted chase and
268. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1275.
269. Id.
270. See Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57,
64–65 (2000).
271. 18 U.S.C. § 3553; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.
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physical tussle with Rodney King, however, had not been contem-
plated by the Sentencing Commission, thus a downward departure
was justified in sentencing the officers who deprived him of his civil
rights by repeatedly battering him once he was subdued.
Notwithstanding these limits on the usefulness of these depar-
tures to create standards of legitimacy, the large body of case law has
produced some information that can serve as guidance on the exer-
cise of discretion in the absence of standards. A study of 1400 depar-
tures prior to Booker and Fan Fan considered the basis for such
departures.272 Federal courts considered the defendant’s lack of
youthful guidance,273 the disparity in the treatment of the co-defen-
dant,274 his or her family responsibilities,275 mental and emotional
condition,276 and past military service.277 Some jurisdictions were
particularly sympathetic to drug couriers,278 suggesting that courts
in those jurisdictions were considering the limited degree of culpabil-
ity of those types of offenders.279 These departures can thus provide
at least some guidance on the equitable considerations prosecutors
ought to consider, even though these considerations are limited to
those not already taken into account by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
H. Remedies for Decisions of Counsel Ineffectively Advising
Rejection of Pleas
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court appears to have provided
another opportunity for courts to shape how prosecutors go about ex-
ercising their discretion.280 Whether or not the Court was aware of
the potential impact on charging and bargaining decisions, the
Court’s decisions occurred in plea bargaining cases, suggesting that
272. Gelachak, Nagel & Johnson, supra note 267, at 305.
273. Id. at 360.
274. Id. This is, of course, precisely the sort of analysis that legislatures following
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) anticipated appellate courts performing pro-
portionality review would conduct.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 361.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 364.
279. Some jurisdictions have expressly considered the possibility that drug couri-
ers are liable only for the amount of drugs they could have known they possessed. See
People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993) (accepting such a claim, before New York
legislature amended law to prevent such claims). But see People v. Scheffer, 224 P.3d
279 (Colo.App. 2009) (rejecting such a claim); Whitaker v. People, 48 P.3d 555 (Colo.
2002) (same).
280. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399
(2012).
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the Court had in mind the potential for its opinion to reign in
prosecutorial discretion in this area.281
Until 2012, the United States Supreme Court had not recognized
a right to an effective criminal negotiator.282 When it did so in Lafler
v. Cooper, it concluded that when a trial court finds that a defendant
received unreasonable advice recommending that he or she go to
trial, the defendant could obtain a remedy.283 The Court provided
only vague guidance as to what that remedy should be, and gave trial
judges extraordinary discretion.284 The Court concluded that a judge
considering the remedy could leave in place the sentence initially im-
posed, re-sentence the defendant to the amount of time offered in a
plea rejected because of counsel’s ineffective advice, or a sentence
modification anywhere in between.285
While the Court appears at first glance to have given lower
courts unfettered discretion to fashion a remedy for unreasonable ad-
vice to go to trial, closer inspection reveals that trial courts are ex-
pected to evaluate the reasoning underlying a prosecutor’s offer.
First, courts may not categorically deny remedies to defendants
whose lawyers unreasonably instructed them to go to trial rather
than accept plea offers.286 Second, that remedy may not provide a
windfall to a defendant who has gone to trial and lost.287
To apply the Court’s instructions, a trial court must therefore de-
termine what plea offers — or what portion of plea offers — would
amount to a windfall.288 To understand that is to understand why a
281. Justice Scalia thought the Court was opening up the possibility of future reg-
ulation of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining with these decisions. See Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is not at all unusual
for cases about constitutional criminal procedure to have more of an effort on plea
bargaining than on matter expressly sought to be regulated. Donald Dripps, for in-
stance, had concluded that the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), ostensibly about the duty to present live testimony even when the hearsay is
reliable and fits within an exception to the rule, has had a far greater impact on plea
bargaining than it had on trials themselves. Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155,
1162–66 (2005).
282. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, 102
KY. L. J. 1, 4 (2013–14) (“Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court regarded plea
offers to be a matter of largesse, severely limiting defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment
obligations in negotiations.”).
283. Lafler, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388–90 (2012).
284. See id.
285. See id. at 1290.
286. Id. at 1391.
287. Id. at 1388.
288. Justice Ginsberg recognized that providing a defendant a remedy for a lost
plea that was premised on cooperation would amount to a windfall for the defendant.
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prosecutor would have offered the plea in the first place. If a prosecu-
tor offered leniency to account for a risk of acquittal, then restoring
the original plea offer would give a defendant an opportunity for ac-
quittal at trial while preserving his bet-hedging offer. Furthermore,
the risk of acquittal is not the only basis for a prosecutor to grant
leniency that would provide a defendant a windfall if that leniency is
re-offered post-trial.289 A defendant also receives a windfall if the
plea was offered to save prosecution resources or contingent on coop-
eration. Nothing about the risk of acquittal, the need to conserve
prosecution resources, or obtain cooperation has anything to do with
how a defendant ought to be punished. In a sense, a defendant al-
ways receives a windfall when he or she is able to obtain leniency
because the prosecution has difficulties of proof, the trial will con-
sume considerable time, or the defendant has information that is val-
uable to the prosecution.290 Post-trial, the exchange of leniency for
certainty, convenience, or information is no longer possible.
If appellate courts following Lafler are to achieve the Supreme
Court’s stated goal of avoiding a windfall, then they must identify the
portion of the plea that was motivated by the prosecutor’s instrumen-
tal motivations and the portion motivated by the prosecutor’s views of
the equities of the case. Pre- or post-trial, not all plea offers are wind-
falls. Prosecutors, in not an insubstantial number of cases, offer a
plea deal that the prosecutor believes to reflect the appropriate pun-
ishment for a defendant in a particular case. Professor Alschuler’s
groundbreaking field research of plea bargaining revealed that most
prosecutors believe that it is incredibly important to make offers that
reflect an appropriate sentence.291
When courts describe the motivations of a prosecutor for offers
that were rejected, courts will be articulating how they believe rea-
sonable prosecutors view cases. This will provide perhaps the clearest
external standard describing how prosecutors ought to exercise their
discretion.292 Cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel during
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 19–20 (2013) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (the remedy
should not include leniency that was premised on cooperation that is no longer
possible).
289. But see id. (arguing that remedy following a trial would grant a windfall be-
cause a defendant is exchanging risk of acquittal for leniency).
290. See, e.g., Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Assymmetrics and Incentives in Plea
Bargaining and Evidence Production, 122 YALE L.J. 690, 705 (2012) (describing dis-
counts to cooperators as a windfall).
291. See Alschuler, supra note 72, at 52–53.
292. For a more thorough description of this argument, see Oliver, supra note 282
at 19–32.
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the plea bargaining phase may well be infrequent — just as all cases
finding ineffective assistance of counsel are infrequent — but the gui-
dance courts provide in these cases may be the most useful. Unlike
decisions that involve less serious cases (de minimis statutes or pre-
trial diversion) or the most serious cases (proportionality review), de-
cisions regarding remedies for unreasonable advice in the negotiation
phase will run the gamut from less serious to quite serious.
V. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors alone have traditionally defined how their discretion
to charge and plea bargain ought to be exercised. In a system that
fundamentally rests on the principle of checks and balances,293 al-
lowing this much power to vest in the hands of one department of the
government is, at the very least, anomalous.294 Judges, however, are
part of this conversation, even if their participation in the conversa-
tion has not been as robust as it could be and the significance of their
contributions has yet to be recognized.
Certainly this is not to say that judges, even in a limited sphere
of cases do, or should, have the last authoritative word on how prose-
cutors exercise their discretion. The way judges make decisions, how-
ever, makes their contributions to the discussion about prosecutorial
power a particularly useful source for guidance on how particular
cases should be charged and resolved. Prosecutorial discretion typi-
cally occurs quietly, often with no accompanying explanation. In con-
trast, written explanations typically accompany judicial orders; the
more thorough the analysis, the better respected the opinion.
The genius of the common law is that it makes the reasoning of a
decision-maker public and thus subject to criticism, which can place
pressure on subsequent courts to distinguish subsequent cases, or
simply overrule the previous decision. As court opinions describe how
prosecutorial discretion ought to operate, they put their conclusions
into the marketplace of ideas where, like any other type of decision,
they become subject to critique.295 Courts are aware of this process
293. See James T. Barry, III, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 241, at n.21 (1989) (observing implicit reliance of
Framers on Montesquieu’s notion of separation of powers); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison) (“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).
294. See Barkow, supra note 5, at 1012–13.
295. Obviously this criticism can come internally in the form of a dissent. An ex-
cellent example of a debate about the appropriate use of which factors are appropri-
ately considered in granting leniency appears in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 510 A.2d
1389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The majority affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant a
motion to dismiss charges of prison rioting on the grounds that (1) the defendants
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before rendering decisions and thus account for possible counter-ar-
guments. Opinions, once released, can become thoroughly discredited
even if they are not overruled.296 The factors that courts find relevant
when exercising pseudo-prosecutorial power thus provides insight
into what an informed, respected commentator regards as appropri-
ate considerations for one exercising prosecutorial discretion.
The scholarship on negotiation demonstrates how courts are able
to act, without infringing upon the separation of powers, to provide
guidance on the largely unchecked power of prosecutors. Judges, in
their occasional exercise of prosecutorial-type discretion, create stan-
dards of legitimacy that can be used by defense counsel in plea nego-
tiations. These standards have the potential to improve by soft
regulation the charging and plea bargaining process criticized by
commentators as secretive, idiosyncratic, and lacking the attributes
of the rule of law.
were already serving prison sentences; (2) the defendants had already been subject to
internal prison discipline; (3) the costs of trial were not justified; and (4) the inmates
efforts to prevent guards from seizing an inmate who had just stabbed a man were
brief and caused no harm. Id. The dissent persuasively contended that none of these
were appropriate factors for consideration under the de minimis statute. Id.
296. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (identifying
Dred Scott, Korematsu, and Plessey v. Ferguson as erroneous decisions of historic pro-
portions, the error of which were recognized well before they over-ruled).
